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DEFENDING STATE EXEMPTIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY
Tristan G. Axelrod1
Abstract

T

hroughout the past century’s cyclical battles for bankruptcy
reform, legislators and scholars have debated the need for federal
control over bankruptcy estate exemptions. Millionaire criminals and
Wall Street hucksters shielding assets from creditors provide perennial
fuel for the argument that bankruptcy exemptions inspire systemic
abuse. Few legislators, scholars, or pundits, however, have
investigated the actual economic and social policy wisdom in statespecific exemptions as they affect the lives of millions of Americans.
This Article examines the origins and policy implications of statespecific exemption laws and argues in favor of limited federal
deference to state law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

How much should state laws be allowed to conflict with
federal bankruptcy law and policy? Let’s consider a hypothetical:
Debbie Debtor buys a house in the state of Grimes, which has a
generous homestead exemption law and has opted out of related
federal law. A hurricane strikes, Debbie’s house floods, and it loses
some of its value. Fortunately, the home is insured. But the flooding
destroys the community economy, and Debbie loses her job and

1

Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, S. D. Fla, Hon. Erik Kimball. JD, Boston
College Law School, 2014. My thanks to Professor Ingrid Hillinger for her support
and encouragement. Thanks also to Joanna Allison, Emily Jarrell, and Hsindy Chen
at Volunteer Lawyers Project for the research assignments and guidance that led to
this Article.
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acquires significant unsecured debt before regaining her footing. She
files for bankruptcy protection so that she can start anew. Question:
should the insurance check for the home damage count as an exempt
asset? On the one hand, Grimes law grants exemptions only to real
estate, not to any related cash proceeds. On the other hand, the
insurance money is an effective substitute for an asset that would’ve
been exempt, but for Debbie’s misfortune. If the cash is not exempt,
the trustee will distribute it to credit card companies that never
bargained for a piece of Debbie’s house, and thus receive a windfall
from the flood damage.2
Cases have come out both ways: for instance, in In re Gilley, a
small farmer received and retained restitution from a chemical
company that damaged his soil.3 In In re Plant, the court handed over
to the trustee for distribution to creditors a homeowner’s settlement
check for negligent construction by a contractor.4 This disparity raises
interesting questions of how much latitude the federal government
should provide to states to implement their own exemption laws. Over
the past twenty years, many parties have argued that states should not
be able to pass laws applicable only in bankruptcy, a hypothetically
federal system. The disparate results under varying state laws may
seem antithetical to a system the Founding Fathers called “uniform.”
The current consumer bankruptcy exemption regime derives
from centuries-old traditions of state law competence over property
rights, family law, and debtor-creditor relations.5 It flies in the face,
however, of the general movement toward a centralized, standardized
federal bankruptcy law. Scholars have debated this controversy
between age-old state law and more modern federal law throughout
the past few decades.6 In 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
2

See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2011) (including no provisions for insurance or other
cash proceeds as resulting from damage to a homestead). As this Article will show,
however, the courts’ equitable powers and the “fresh start” ideology of bankruptcy
trump these statutory concerns. Thus, in this scenario, Debbie’s insurance check
would almost certainly be exempted in any state or under federal law.
3
In re Gilley, 236 B.R. 441, 442–47 (Bankr. M. D. Fla. 1999).
4
In re Plant, 300 B.R. 22, 23–24 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003).
5
See infra notes 38-157 and accompanying text.
6
See, e.g., Judith Schenk Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws:
A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22
(1983) (arguing for a return to ideas of uniformity propounded by the framers of the
constitution); Justin Pratt, The Inequitable Situation: A Look at the Bankruptcy
Exemption After Five Years of Judicial Interpretation, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA),7
intended to reinforce federal oversight.8
Even since BAPCPA, scholars continue to criticize the
Bankruptcy Code for allowing so much variation in outcome simply
based on age-old, state-specific property laws.9 Questions remain as to
whether this subservience to state law compromises the Code’s
effectiveness.10 On the one hand, scholars and creditors’ lobbyists
complain that some state laws are too generous to debtors and thus
PROP. L.J. 97 (2010) (advocating reform of 2005 federal legislation meant to
harmonize state and federal exemption laws); Victor D. López, State Homestead
Exemptions and Bankruptcy Law: Is it Time for Congress to Close the Loophole?, 7
RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 143 (2010) (recommending expansive federal control over
homestead exemptions in bankruptcy); David A. Simole & David L. Rosendorff,
Homestead Exemption No Longer Debtors’ Paradise, 24-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J.
6 (2006) (reviewing efficacy of 2005 legislation in reconciling state and federal
law); Matthew J. Kemner, Personal Bankruptcy Discharge and the Myth of the
Unchecked Homestead Exemption, 56 MO. L. REV. 683 (1991) (examining prebankruptcy planning issues in light of federal requirements and variations in state
law); Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions and Their Effect on Federal
Bankruptcy Laws, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 71 (2004) (recommending a
uniform cap on state homestead exemptions); Timothy R. Tarvin, Bankruptcy,
Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving Your Homestead Exemption
Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141 (2001)
(illustrating failure of current federal law to prevent abuse and protect creditors);
Jeremy Berkowitz et al., Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage
Loans, 42 J. L. & ECON. 809 (1999) (finding that variation in state exemption laws
has little impact on consumer market for secured credit).
7
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as it pertains to this Article
at 11 U.S.C. §522 (2011) unless otherwise noted).
8
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005) (declaring bill’s purpose to
increase debtor financial responsibility and payout to creditors); López, supra note
6, at 145; Pratt, supra note 6, at 101–07; Samole & Rosendorf, supra note 6, at 6.
9
See, e.g., López, supra note 6, at 166–68; Pratt, supra note 6, at 117–21
(recommending further federal oversight as BAPCPA reform); Brook E. Gotberg,
Restructuring the Bankruptcy System: A Strategic Response to Stern v. Marshall, 87
AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 233–45 (advocating a “strategic approach to ‘uniform’
bankruptcy law”); Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of ‘Uniform’ Laws,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1166 (2012) (arguing that state-specific laws allow
discrimination on the basis of state citizenship); see also Edward Stechschulte,
Comment, The (Un)Constitutionality of State-Enacted Bankruptcy-Specific
Exemptions: Using Ohio Revised Code Section 2329.66(A)(18) as a Mechanism for
Analysis, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 761, 782–83 (arguing that state bankruptcy-specific
exemptions are per se unconstitutional); Koffler, supra note 6, at 105–06 (lamenting
lack of uniformity in pre-BAPCPA period).
10
See sources cited in supra note 9.

Axelrod ArticleAxelrod Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015

State Exemptions in Bankruptcy

3/9/15 5:47 PM

287

discourage personal financial responsibility and encourage abuse of
the bankruptcy discharge.11 Critics also argue that the laws are out-ofdate, reflecting 19th century values and garnering 19th century
results.12 Some critics even raise the possibility that federal deference
to state law would be unconstitutional.13 These critics have
propounded a movement for “uniform” bankruptcy laws reflecting the
language of the U.S. constitution.
These arguments overlook the fact that in Plant, Gilley, and a
plethora of other cases, judges decided to grant or not grant
exemptions based on uniform bankruptcy principles.14 In other words,
11

See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 486, 488 (1983) (argument by the International Consumer
Credit Association that exemptions unfairly allow consumers to avoid debts);
Personal Bankruptcy: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
669 (1981–82) (argument of American Retail Federation in favor of minimum
repayment plan); Edward Dufner, With Consumer Bankruptcies Soaring, The Rules
Could Be In For A Tightening, The Morning Call (Mar. 16, 1997) (describing
creditors’ lobbyists input on draft legislation for a uniform exemption ceiling).
12
Compare, e.g., Jordan B. Cherrick, The Homestead Act: An Important Law to
Protect the Family But a Law in Need of Reform, 65 MASS. L. REV. 175, 175
(1981); Rivera, supra note 6, at 100–01 (noting that dollar limits in some states are
too low to protect significant assets), with Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1108
(2009) (arguing that dollar limits are often too high because minimal asset
protection is required to ensure a family’s fresh start in the modern period); see also
Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 678, 681–84 (1960) (arguing that state exemption laws are out of date,
reflecting legislative apathy); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 126 (1978) (stating that state
exemption laws are “outmoded, designed for more rural times, and hopelessly
inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modern urban
debtors”). Statutory language is itself sometimes arcane. See, e.g., M.A. G.L. c. 235
§34 (granting exemption for “2 cows, 12 sheep, 2 swine and 4 tons of hay”,
presumably as necessary for subsistence farming).
13
See, e.g., Austin, supra note 9, at 1166–68 (arguing that some exemption
laws are unconstitutional); Koffler, supra note 6, at 23–28 (describing the
“constitutional mandate” of uniformity and critiquing the exemption provisions of
the 1978 act); Stechschulte, supra note 7, at 782 (declaring certain state exemption
laws unconstitutional).
14
See Plant, 300 B.R. at 24 (noting that debtor’s exemption was unharmed by
negligence of defendant); Gilley, 236 B.R. at 446–47 (describing conditions for
exemption that protect the law’s “real, underlying purpose”) (citing Hill v. First.
Nat. Bank, 84 So. 190, 193 (Fla. 1920); see, e.g., In re Thurston, 2007 WL 1860892,
No. 99–11836–JNF, at *13 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 27, 2007) (denying exemption

Axelrod Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/9/15 5:47 PM

288

Vol. 27:2

Loyola Consumer Law Review

specific results in bankruptcy cases often depend upon what the
debtor’s fresh start requires or justifies. Mr. Gilley, for instance,
demonstrated intent to reinvest the restitution proceeds into his
property and thus re-establish his previous equity holding.15 By
contrast, Ms. Plant’s intentions remained unclear, and the court
doubted that there had been actual damage to her home equity
position; thus, the settlement did not operate as a substitute for her
exempt asset.16 In cases denying exemptions, courts have widely
noted that their decisions reflected specific distrust for the debtor and
their intentions.17
The Code does not require uniform application throughout the
fifty states. States should be free to modify the allowed exemptions
based on unique concerns reflecting the complex interplay of cost of
living, property rights, and the socioeconomic status and rights of
families. Thus, the dollar amounts, physical size, specific definitions,
and intra-state transferability of homesteads should remain exclusive
to state law. Bankruptcy courts can adequately resolve any resulting
conflicts between state and federal law.
This Article refutes the idea that state exemptions lead to
unfair or unconstitutional results. Available data shows that
differences in state exemption value limits have no statistical effect on
filings and that the current federal law, while flawed, does impede
where debtor’s “belated amendments to his Schedules suggest concealment of an
asset and prejudice to creditors, who may have questioned the Debtor about his
claims against the abutter to his real property had they been adequately disclosed”);
In re Wiesner, 267 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (denying exemption after
post-petition fire destroyed homestead, also killing debtor); In re Ziegler, 239 B.R.
375, 379–80 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1999) (denying exemption of proceeds after debtors
sold home to other family members with no intent to invest in new homestead).
15
Gilley, 236 B.R. at 446.
16
See Plant, 300 B.R. at 24–25. The debtor had failed to initially claim the
cause of action as an asset and had made a number of misstatements, including an
overestimation of her equity. Id. Mr. Gilley also made some disclosure errors, but
the tone of the Gilley decision indicates favorability to the debtor’s plight. See
Gilley, 236 B.R. at 442–43.
17
See, e.g., Thurston, 2007 WL 1860892 at *13 (denying exemption on basis of
concealment of assets), Ziegler, 239 B.R. at 379–90 (denying exemption on basis of
bad faith); In re White, 389 B.R. 693, 697 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
bankruptcy court’s denial of exemption on statutory grounds related to debtor’s
frittering away homestead sale proceeds on speculative derivatives trading); In re
Orlando, 359 B.R. 395, 400 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding that debtor’s bad faith
concealment of assets justified denial of exemption).
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malfeasance by wealthy debtors.18 In fact, the existing exemption
regime allows judges leeway to accomplish the bankruptcy system’s
primary goals. Furthermore, it reserves to states their ability to
innovate and adapt policy to local needs and cultural norms.
Part II of this Article provides background information
regarding the homestead exemption, its legislative and political
history, and the underlying relationship between state and federal
law.19 Part III analyzes perceived problems with the exemption
regime.20 Part IV offers two arguments in favor of the current, semiuniform regime for exemptions in consumer bankruptcy.21
II.

BACKGROUND

Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a separate legal
entity that succeeds to the debtor’s property.22 That entity, the
“estate,” is managed by a court-appointed trustee or, in the case of
reorganization under chapter 11, by the debtor itself.23 The trustee or
debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) collects all of the debtor’s assets into the
estate and pays distributions to creditors therefrom.24

18

See, e.g., Tarvin, supra note 6, at 187–203 (“the arbitrary nature of the
present rule is potentially harsh to creditor and debtor alike because it fails to
consider whether the debtor has benefited from the relocation or whether the
creditor has been harmed”); Leslie A. Shames, Calling a Fraud a Fraud: Why
Congress Should Not Adopt a Uniform Cap on Homestead Exemptions, 16 BANKR.
DEV. J. 191, 203–04 (reviewing statistical literature); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., As
We Forgive Our Debtors 241–44 (1989) (showing no difference in bankruptcy
filings between low-limit states and unlimited exemption states).
19
See infra notes 22–157 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 158–255 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 257–280 and accompanying text.
22
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2011); see Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 35, 308 (“[a]n
exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors)
for the benefit of the debtor”); In re Reed, 184 B.R. 733, 737–38 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1995) (discussing case law regarding nature of exemption); see also Tristan
Axelrod, Comment, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v.
Chi. Am. Manuf., LLC Sets a New Course for Trademark License Rejection in
Bankruptcy, 40 RUTGERS L. REC. 118, 121–22 (2013) (discussing the nature of the
estate as relevant to the trustee’s rejection power).
23
11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a) at 704(granting the trustee authority and enumerating its
specific duties).
24
See id. § 704. Duties of the trustee include collection and dispersal of funds,
investigation of possible legal claims by and against the debtor, and others. Id.
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The debtor has the option to claim some assets as exempt from
the estate and thus exempt from distribution to creditors.25 The most
common exemptions operate at state law outside of bankruptcy as part
of the state’s traditional regulation of personal and real property.
Exemption laws protect debtors from creditors in a manner analogous
to state laws governing asset division following divorce or intestate
succession—i.e., they form part of a body of mostly state-specific
laws governing what a citizen owns that may be accessed by other
persons through the legal system.
Typically the largest and most valuable exemption laws render
some portion of a debtor’s primary residence, or “homestead,” exempt
from creditors.26 This Article will thus focus mostly on homestead
exemption issues, although similar policy concerns exist with regard
to automobiles and other personal property.
In bankruptcy, state exemptions operate in tandem with federal
exemptions under the terms of the Code. Primarily, the Code and its
case law allow states to enact their own legislation describing the
circumstances and extent to which the exemption may be claimed.27
States can either “opt out” of the federal homestead exemptions and
25

See 11 USC § 522. Exemption often conflicts with the trustee’s desire to
maximize payout. See, e.g., Plant, 300 B.R. at 23 (reopening debtor’s case at
trustee’s request); Gilley, 236 B.R. at 442 (responding to trustee motion to deny
exemption); Reed, 184 B.R. at 737–38 (discussing ramifications of trustee motion to
avoid transfer of exempt assets). The trustee has two fundamental tasks: first, to
ensure the debtor’s “fresh start” free from previous burdens, and second, to
maximize the value of the estate and thus the payout to creditors. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 704. Duties of the trustee include collection and dispersal of funds, investigation
of possible legal claims by and against the debtor, and others. Id.
26
The homestead exemption applies under federal law to “real or personal
property that the debtor or their dependents use as a residence” or otherwise claim
as a homestead. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). In other words and very generally under
similar state laws, a debtor who owns their own home is able to shield some portion
of it from unsecured creditors. See, e.g., id. (granting exemption up to $15,000).
Non-homestead exemptions tend to be comparatively limited in dollar value. See,
e.g., id. at § 522(d) (limiting exemptions at $15,000 for homesteads, $2,400 for an
automobile, and up to $8,000 in aggregate for all personal property); compare, e.g.,
M.A. G.L. c. 188 § 1 (allowing homestead exemption up to $500,000), with id. c.
235 § 34 (allowing personal property exemption of various assets typically valued
under $5,000 and limited thereabouts).
27
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); Owen, 500 U.S. at 305–06; see also Storer v.
French (In re Storer), 58 F.3d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1995) (allowing state
exemptions that are either more or less restrictive than the federal exemptions).
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limitations, or allow debtors to choose the more beneficial of the
two.28 The Code, however, sets limitations on the dollar amounts of
exemptions in the event that the state does not enact its own
exemptions.29 Furthermore, both the Code and state laws declare
limitations on the transfer of property, acquisition of equity prior to
the exemption claim, and the types of non-real property assets that can
substitute for equity in the claim.30 These limitations are intended to
prevent debtors from abusing the exemption to improperly hide
money from creditors.31
The complex interplay of state and federal law in this area is a
microcosm for the two broad and conflicting goals of bankruptcy in
general. On the one hand, the fresh start for the honest but unfortunate
debtor allows citizens to resume socially and economically productive
lives without crushing debt and without becoming a burden on the
public.32 On the other hand, bankruptcy attempts to assure fair and
equal treatment for similarly situated creditors.33 By the nowtraditional understanding of bankruptcy policy, the former requires
that the debtor retain housing and the tools and sustenance to sustain
family and business life,34 while the latter requires that the debtor
28

Because property law is generally under the domain of states, the relevant
state law would be that of the debtor’s claimed homestead, which will also be that in
which the debtor files for protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). Most states opt
out of the federal exemptions. See López, supra note 6, at 148–65 (describing laws
of every state and noting significant trends).
29
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
30
See id. §522(b),(p),(q) (noting timing and transfer limits); see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1101 (2014) (permitting exemption of identifiable cash
proceeds within eighteen months of sale date); Mass. G.L. c. 188, §11(a) (allowing
exemption of proceeds as resulting from sales, takings, and natural disasters).
31
See Tarvin, supra note 6, at 147–53.
32
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (noting the primary
purpose of bankruptcy to unburden honest debtors from pressures of financial
failure).
33
See Nathanson v. N.L.R.B., 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (noting that equality of
distribution to creditors of similar classes is the dominant theme of U.S. bankruptcy
law); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy’s Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2097, 2101–02 (1990) (describing bankruptcy as a collective remedy defined by
equal treatment of creditors of similar classes).
34
See Laura B. Bartell, The Peripatetic Debtor: Choice of Law and Choice of
Exemptions, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 401, 402–03 (2006) (describing commonly
understood and evolving policy behind exemptions).
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liquidate all possible assets to maximize payouts to deserving
parties.35
Exactly how and why the law exists as it does today requires a
brief overview of two centuries’ worth of legislative and judicial
decisions. Section A describes the history of the homestead exemption
in state law.36 Section B describes the evolution of federal bankruptcy
law and the rising conflict with state exemptions.37
A. Evolution of Exemptions in State Law
State exemptions arose in the 19th century amid the needs of
states to encourage settlement, protect the rights of citizens
endangered by the physical and financial hardships of frontier life,
and counteract the common temptation to move to greener pastures in
face of mounting debts. Subsection 1 recounts the development of
state exemptions in the pre-modern era.38 Subsection 2 provides a
brief history of that development in three sample states.39
1. State Land Grants Require State Consumer Protection
Land ownership has been inextricable from citizenship and
social life since European colonists first arrived on the continent.40

35

See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2–8 (2005); Wells M. Engledow,
Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 275, 276–77 (2000) (advocating for a system of “bankruptcy ethics” to
limit debtors’ ability to plan for bankruptcy).
36
See infra notes 38–102 and accompanying text.
37
See infra notes 103–155 and accompanying text.
38
See infra notes 40–60 and accompanying text.
39
See infra notes 61–102 and accompanying text.
40
See Stephen M. Feldman, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin in America, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2012) (noting founders’
belief in land ownership as promoting civic virtue) (citing LETTER FROM THOMAS
JEFFERSON TO JAMES MADISON (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 GREAT ISSUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY 112, 115
(Richard Hofstadter ed., 1982); Tanya D. Marsh, Sometimes Blackacre is a Widget:
Rethinking Commercial Real Estate Contract Remedies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 635, 644–
48 (2010) (recounting importance of land ownership in American political,
commercial, and social culture); see also MacKenzie Breitenstein, The Ideal
Homestead Exemption: Avoiding Asset Conversion and Fraud but Still Protecting
Dependents, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1121, 1124–26 (2010) (noting relationship of
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Colonial governments originally granted voting rights only to
landowners.41 Furthermore, as Europeans moved westward into the
continent, some territorial governments offered inducement to settlers
in the form of land grants guaranteed free of interference from prior
creditors.42
Colonial-era innovations in real estate ownership and
citizenship, combined with the need for commercial regulation of
trans-Atlantic trade, established an aura of legislative entitlement in
the area of debtor-creditor relations.43 America’s ability to grant and
protect land, create a uniform currency and credit market, and engage
in cross-oceanic trade was unprecedented.44 The first several decades
of the country’s history saw legislatures struggling to regulate in
unknown and unstable territory.45 The federal government initially left

homestead exemptions to historic state policies promoting land ownership); Stern,
supra note 12, at 1105–09 (summarizing historical conception of homeownership).
41
See Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men of
Property: Suffrage and Elections in Colonial and Early National America, in
VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF
VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 19, 22–23 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1990)
(noting requirement of land ownership for voting in colonial governments); JAMES
W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 47 (1992) (noting state property ownership requirements for
voting at time of constitution); Barbara Stark, Deconstructing the Framers’ Right to
Property: Liberty’s Daughters and Economic Rights, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963,
973–81 (2000) (describing historical relationship between voting and economic
rights).
42
See Marsh, supra note 56, at 644–45 (noting colonial land grant policies and
resulting cross-colonial competition to attract settlers).
43
See Koffler, supra note 6, at 35, 54 (describing pre-constitutional state
bankruptcy law and policy); see, e.g., Charless & Blow v. Lamberson, 1 Iowa 435,
439 (1855) (noting the propriety of homestead exemptions in light of state policy);
Interpretive Commentary, Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50 (1973) (noting Texas’s colonialera entitlement to protect debtors from creditors in interest of public policy).
44
See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(describing cultural, financial, legal, and military developments as a result of
American independence).
45
See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR.
DEV. J. 321, 323–24 (noting that “the standard story of American bankruptcy history
is a tale of bust and boom” but that legislative history also reflects controversy
between agrarian and commercial values).
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the business of property law, including land grants and debtor real
estate protection, almost entirely to the states and territories.46
By the mid-19th century, in the face of cyclical land busts and
bank failures and mindful of the country’s growing commercial
economy, state governments recognized that mere grants of land were
insufficient to stabilize settlement and commerce.47 Citizens required
legal protection to offset the physical and financial risks of life on the
developing agricultural and urban frontiers.48 Women and minorities,
indispensable constituencies of the new political order, were likewise
demanding their own rights and protections.49 Exemptions exploded
across the country in response.50
Exemptions for homes, tools, clothing, and other essential
property have remained inextricable from policy conceptions of
family life, debtor-creditor relations, and socially valuable behavior
46

See id. The short-lived bankruptcy acts of the 19th century did include
exemptions for personal property. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, 23
(1800); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841); Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
14 Stat. 517, 522–23 (1867).
47
See Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption
and Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAW &
HIST. REV. 245, 252–55 (2006); Skeel, supra note 42, at 323–24. Land grants
effectively caused a race to the bottom, as with each financial panic, families tore up
stakes and moved to new territories to the west. See Morantz, at 252–55. As the
frontier moved onward, older states experimented with economic policies to protect
and stabilize their already-settled populations. See id.
48
See id. (also noting involvement of activists in the land reform, abolition,
temperance, and labor movements).
49
See id.
50
See Paul Goodman, “The Emergence of the Homestead Exemption in the
United States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840–
1880,” Journal of American History 80 (1993): 470–98. Reconstruction and the
South’s post-bellum poverty hastened the advent of exemption laws as former slave
states feared that insolvent Southerners’ farmland would be snatched up at auction
by northern carpetbaggers and free blacks. See Eric Foner, A SHORT HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 45–48; Goodman, “The
Emergence of the Homestead Exemption in the United States” at 491. Furthermore,
states equated enforcement of debts incurred by white men to buy property—
including slaves, now freed—to slavery itself. See Donald R. Korobkin, Bankruptcy
Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 2124, 2141–43 (2003)
(describing Congressional debate of the 1867 Bankruptcy Act). By 1868, every
Southern state had passed an exemption law. Morantz, supra note 45, at 253. But
see 14 Stat. 517, 522–23 (limiting post-bellum bankruptcy homestead exemptions to
1864 state exemption levels).
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since the 19th century.51 Protection of debtor property was bound
intimately to similar protections for laborers, women, and others who
pursued greater liberty in the 19th century.52 In fact, some scholars
argue that the homestead exemption was the first “social safety net,”
predating the Depression-era New Deal by many decades.53
Furthermore, homestead exemptions continued to evolve and grow
along with, and sometimes in conflict with, federal power and federal
social welfare programs that grew after the New Deal.54 Thus, judges
and scholars realized that a coherent discourse and jurisprudence of
the subject could influence and help stabilize public policy.55
In the modern era, state exemptions carry the weight of almost
200 years of state-law policy and precedent.56 The only remaining
states without homestead exemptions are the northern bastions of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.57 Texas, with its frontier ethos and
constitutional exemption dating to at least 1829, grants an exemption

51

See Goodman, supra note 48, at 470–98; Korobkin, supra note 50, at 2141–
43; Morantz, supra note 45, at 250–51.
52
See Morantz, supra note 45, at 253.
53
See id.; THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992).
54
See infra notes 122-155 and accompanying text (describing policy conflicts
relating to state exemption laws).
55
See, e.g., Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 189–190 (1902)
(holding that bankruptcy uniformity permits recognition of state exemption laws
despite disparate results in different states); Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455
U.S. 457, 469 (1982) (discussing uniformity of exemption laws and holding the
1978 act constitutional); Morantz, supra note 45, at 250 (“[d]ecades before such
definitions were thought to figure in public policy, what it meant to be a husband or
wife, a provider or dependent—and even what it meant to be a “family”—
preoccupied U.S. judges struggling to develop a coherent body of homestead
exemption jurisprudence”); Austin, supra note 9, at 1139–41 (describing problems
with coherence of current doctrine).
56
See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. IX, § 3 (granting homestead exemption to debtors
who are “married or the head of a family”); infra notes 61-102 and accompanying
text (describing development of exemption law in Florida, Arizona, and
Massachusetts).
57
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8124 (2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:17-17 (2008).
Citizens of those states may rely on minimum exemptions in the federal Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(1).
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of unlimited dollar value.58 Subpart 2 of this Part provides a
descriptive overview of three sample states.59 Part B of this Section
describes the development of the federal Code and its interaction with
these variegated state laws.60
2. State Exemptions in Federal Bankruptcy: Three Examples
a. Florida
Florida was one of many states to pass homestead exemption
laws to protect families in the wake of the Civil War.61 The original
homestead exemption, enshrined in the state constitution, was
unlimited in real estate value, as long as the property was no larger
than 160 acres outside an incorporated city or town or ½ acre inside.62
It also included a personal property exemption up to one thousand
dollars and a requirement that the debtor be a head of household.63
The 160-acre and head-of-household restrictions reflect restrictions on
land grants in the Homestead Act of 1862.64 The 1862 act, passed by a
northern Congress during the Civil War, also limited grants to
applicants who had not “borne arms against the United States
Government” and who farmed the land for five years and improved
it.65 Thus, Florida’s exemption originally protected a certain class of
debtor that moved to and speculated within the frontier state in the
wake of the Civil War. Value limits on homesteads might have been

58

Tex. Const. art. 16, § 51 (2007); see Interpretive Commentary, Tex. Const.
art. 16, § 50 (1973) (noting Texas’s colonial-era entitlement to protect debtors from
creditors in interest of public policy).
59
See infra notes 61-102 and accompanying text.
60
Infra notes 103-157 and accompanying text.
61
See Fla. Const. of 1868, art. IX (1868); De Cottes v. Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 9–
10 (Fla. 1901) (describing purpose and liberal interpretation of the exemption);
Josephine W. Thomas, Increasing the Homestead Tax Exemption: “Tax Relief” or
Burden on Florida Homeowners and Local Governments?, 35 STETSON L. REV.
509, 517–18 (2006).
62
Fla. Const. of 1868, art. IX, §1 (1868).
63
Id.; De Cottes, 43 Fla. at 9–10 (determining head of household
interpretation).
64
See Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (authorizing grants of up to 160
acres of federal land to citizens who had not “borne arms against the United States
Government”).
65
Id.
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difficult to prove at the time because the relevant homestead tracts had
been granted at fixed value without ever being commercially traded.66
Despite the anachronistic size constraints, Florida’s exemption
is substantially unchanged with regard to debtor-creditor relations.67
The physical size limits remain at 160 acres and ½ acre depending
upon incorporation, and even the accompanying personal property
exemption remains at one thousand dollars.68 In 1968, Florida
removed the requirement that debtors claiming exemptions be the
heads of family households.69 The exempt property does still inure to
the debtor’s family members after death.70
Florida’s courts, including its federal bankruptcy judges,
interpret the homestead exemption with notable liberality.71 The
state’s supreme court extended the exemption to single women in
1901.72 The same court also decided in 1962 to include the proceeds
of sales of the homestead, as long as the debtor displayed good faith
and the intention to reinvest in a new home.73 The courts have further
extended the proceeds inclusion to substitute housing expenses and, as
noted in Gilley, restitution damages.74
The state legislature and its courts have repeatedly, and in
many circumstances, declined to limit the exemption. Florida’s
constitution does not diminish the exemption for debtors who are
66

Moreover, an appraisal value of a farming homestead likely correlated more
to its farming capacity than its location and fixtures. Thus, the propriety of the sizelimited exemption today is highly doubtful.
67
Compare Fla. Const. of 1868, art. IX (1868) (setting terms of exemption),
with Fla. Const. art. X, §4 (same).
68
Fla. Const. art. X, §4(a)(2).
69
Compare id. (requiring debtor be head of household), with Fla. Const. of
1968, art. VII, §6 (no head of household requirement); see Vandiver v. Vincent, 139
So.2d 704, 707–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (describing history and purpose of
homestead exemption).
70
Fla. Const. art. X, §4(b).
71
See, e.g., Gilley, 236 B.R. at 444–45 (extending exemption to proceeds of
litigation related to damaged equity position and describing interpretive history of
the exemption); Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, 137 So.2d
201, 206 (Fla. 1962); De Cottes, 43 Fla. at 9–10 (granting status as head of
household to single mother and describing liberal purpose of the exemption).
72
De Cottes, 43 Fla. at 9–10.
73
Orange Brevard, 137 So.2d at 206.
74
See In re Binko, 258 B.R. 515, 517–18 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (including
expenses on substitute housing during the search for a new home); Gilley, 236 B.R.
at 444–45.

Axelrod Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/9/15 5:47 PM

298

Vol. 27:2

Loyola Consumer Law Review

convicted criminals of any kind.75 The state’s courts have even
declared that “a homestead acquired by a debtor with the specific
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not excepted” from
protection under Florida’s constitution.76 The permissiveness of
Florida’s exemption has drawn heavy criticism, particularly from outof-state creditors.77 Such criticism eventually resulted in changes to
the federal bankruptcy code, discussed in Part B below.78
b. Arizona
The history of Arizona in the 19th century includes a series of
complicated disputes and deals between the United States, Mexico,
and the Confederacy.79 By the close of the Civil War, however, the
territory existed in more or less its present geographical form, under
the control of the U.S. federal government.80 The United States began
encouraging frontier settlement, and by at least 1877, the territory’s
statutes included a homestead exemption.81 The exemption was
limited to $5,000 in value, and included provisions specific to the
territory’s dry terrain and hardscrabble lifestyle: water rights and
75

See Fla. Const. art. X, § 4. There are exceptions for taxes and contractual
requirements. Id. There are also limited exceptions for fraudulent or egregious
conduct, and for avoiding alimony and child support payments. See Dyer v. Beverly
& Tittle, P.A., 777 So.2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (fraudulent or
egregious conduct); Brose v. Brose, 750 So.2d 717, 717–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
76
Havoco of America v. Hill, 790 So.2d 1018, 1030 (Fla. 2001).
77
See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 2938 (2002) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (announcing
proposal to cap homestead equity at $175,000); Editorial, Protecting Rich
Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20 (bankruptcy reform proposal “should
at least be amended to keep Texas and Florida from providing such blatant
protection to once wealthy deadbeats”); see generally Melissa B. Jacoby,
Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
1091 (2004) (describing the role of lobbyists in propounding bankruptcy reform
legislation).
78
See infra notes 140-157 and accompanying text (describing legislative history
and effect of BAPCPA).
79
See “Documents Leading to Statehood,” Ariz. State Library, Archives and
Pub. Records, http://www.azlibrary.gov/sla/documents-leading-statehood (last
visited January 30, 2015). (documenting legal status of Arizona territory in U.S.
history, not including Native American claims).
80
See id.
81
See Hancock v. Herrick, 3 Ariz. 247, 251 (Supreme Ct. Terr. Ariz. 1891)
(citing Comp. Laws 1877, c. 37, §§1-2).
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irrigation fixtures were to run with the exemption, as would
protections for wives as well as liens granted to mechanics, laborers,
and vendors.82
Arizona’s exemption has not been repealed, but has been
modified over time. In 1913, a year after its grant of statehood,
Arizona decreased the value limit of the exemption to four thousand
dollars.83 Today, the exemption stands at $150,000—a theoretical
50% increase from 1913 dollars to 2014 dollars, but for the most part
a decrease in terms of consumer real estate purchase and retention
power.84 Furthermore, the exceptions for laborers, mechanics, and
vendors have been removed.85 Thus, the exemption continues in a
substantially simpler form.
Arizona’s courts maintain a tradition of strict construction of
statutory law, requiring themselves to “apply the plain meaning of the
statute and . . . not interpret the [homestead] statute to create an
exemption the legislature did not intend.”86 The plain meaning of the
statute includes within the exemption only equity value of the
homestead.87 It does not include, and thus courts decline to include,
insurance payments, restitution, or any other non-equity holdings.88
c. Massachusetts
Massachusetts’s homestead exemption differs from the
previous examples in that by the 19th century it was not a frontier state
with vast tracts of available land for white settlers.89 Thus, the impetus
82

Id.
Ariz. Civil Code 1913, par. 3288.
84
Note that this is still vastly higher than the federal exemption. Arizona opts
out of the federal exemption. Other Exemption Laws, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–
1133 (1980).
85
See Homestead Exemptions; Persons Entitled to Hold Homesteads, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1101 (2004).
86
Plant, 300 B.R. at 24 (citing In re Hoffpauir, 125 B.R. 269, 271–74 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1990); see In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 788–91 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
87
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1101 (2014).
88
Plant, 300 B.R. at 24; cf. Hoffpauir, 125 B.R. at 271–74 (denying extension
of personal property exemption to personal injury and employment disability
claims).
89
In fact, the 1862 Homestead Act applied only outside the original 13
colonies, reflecting the view that Massachusetts and the other original states were
completely settled. See 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
83
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for its homestead protections was primarily to protect the rights of
wives whose debtor husbands were considered to hold full title to the
homestead.90 Massachusetts passed a Homestead Act in 1855 that
exempted from creditor attachment designated homesteads up to eight
hundred dollars in value, with specific provisions protecting wives
and widows.91
Massachusetts’ exemption remained unchanged for nearly a
century before it began to catch up with modern views of bankruptcy
and exemptions as social insurance.92 From 1939 to 2004, the state
legislature steadily raised the exemption value from $800 to $500,000,
while keeping the terms and interpretation of the statute essentially
the same.93 Unlike in Arizona or Florida, the state’s judges show a
high degree of variation in their interpretations of statutory law.94 This
caused serious concern in 2008, when financial crisis struck the
nation, resulting in a glut of consumer bankruptcies95 and renewed
concerns about bankruptcy abuse and effectiveness.96 Massachusetts
90

See Lazell v. Lazell, 8 Allen 575, 576–77 (Mass. 1864); Drury v. Bachelder,
11 Gray 214, 215–17 (Mass. 1858).
91
Homestead Act of 1855; Gen. Stat. 1860, c. 104; see Woods v. Sanford, 9
Gray 16, 16 (Mass. 1857).
92
See Gen Stat. 1921, c. 188; Gen. Stat. 1932, c. 188.
93
See Gen Stat. 1939, c. 188; Gen. Stat. 1970, c. 188; Gen. Stat. 2004, c. 188.
94
See, e.g., Thurston, No. 99–11836–JNF, 2007 WL 1860892, at *8 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2007). (denying exemption of all cash proceeds due to absence from statutory
language); compare Wiesner, 267 B.R. at 36 (denying exemption of insurance
proceeds after post-petition fire burned down debtor’s residence), with In re
Cunningham, 354 B.R. 547, 556–57 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that once property is
exempt, it remains exempt regardless of alterations and transfers); compare In re
Kelly, 334 B.R. 772, 775 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (finding that MA G.L. c. 188 § 1,
omitting mobile home exemptions, required strict interpretation), with Gray, 378
B.R. 728, 734–35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding that MA G.L. c. 188 § 1
contained ambiguities that must be resolved liberally in favor of granting
exemptions to debtors).
95
See United States Court Statistics, Bankruptcy Statistics: 12-month period
ending
in
December,
United
States
Courts,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/12-month-period-endingdecember.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). (offering year by year data to show that
non-business bankruptcy filings nearly tripled between 2006 and 2010).
96
See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 395 (2010) (arguing that state
intervention would be more effective than bankruptcy in curing the oncoming glut
of municipal bankruptcies); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J.
435, 513–14 (2011) (arguing that bankruptcy requires accompaniment by effective
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legislators, responding to intense criticism that the state’s antiquated
laws and inconsistent judicial decisions were resulting in excessive
litigation that failed to protect homeowners, overhauled the system
with the Homestead Act of 2010.97
The new law complicated the exemption while greatly
broadening the types of assets it would cover. There would be not one
but two exemptions: an automatic $125,000 exemption for all
homeowners, and a $500,000 exemption for those that file a
homestead declaration with the county registry of deeds.98
Furthermore, the homestead itself was redefined to include proceeds
from sales and insurance policies.99 Other definitions provided for the
rights of the disabled, elderly, and children.100
It is not clear how Massachusetts judges will interpret the new
law, or in practical terms how much the law will benefit the state’s
residents.101 It should be noted, however, that unlike Arizona,
Massachusetts does not opt out of the federal exemptions. Thus, it is
possible that some minimum benefits are preserved in the event that
the exemption is denied under state case law.102

non-bankruptcy measures such as bailouts and haircuts); Michael Simkovic, Paving
the Way for the Next Financial Crisis, 29 No. 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y
REP. 1, 1–2 (2010) (describing how bankruptcy priority rules create systemic risk by
privileging complex securities’ rights to payment); Alan M. White & Caroline Reid,
Saving Homes? Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in the Foreclosure Crisis, 65
FLA. L. REV. 1713, 1736–37 (2013). (using empirical data to show that bankruptcy
filing did not effect successful debtor loan modifications during the financial crisis).
97
See In re Edward R. Szwyd, 346 B.R. 290, 291 n.1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006)
(criticizing antiquated homestead law); Jennifer B. McKim, “New Law Clarifies
Mass. Homestead Protections,” Boston Globe, Dec. 18, 2010; see generally Justin
H. Dion et al, More Homestead Protection and Predictability for Massachusetts
Homeowners?: Examining the Expanded Coverage Under an Act Relative to the
Estate of Homestead, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 99 (2013) (describing problems with
old law and innovations under the 2010 act).
98
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 188, §1 (2014).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See Dion, supra note 97, at 123.
102
In other words, debtors denied exemptions due to any peculiarity of
Massachusetts law might still be eligible for federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(1) (2010).
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B. Exemptions and the Assertion of Federal Power over Bankruptcy
Unlike state protections, the origins of modern federal
exemption law lie mostly in the 20th century. As Congress enacted
laws to keep pace with the country’s rapidly changing consumer
lending marketplace, the concept of a uniform “fresh start” policy
arose concurrently with state exemptions.103 The following section
describes the ascendancy of federal authority over bankruptcy and the
area of exemptions.104
1. From the Founding to 1978
The ratification of the United States Constitution in 1789
granted Congress the power to legislate for “uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies.”105 By that time, the states were already
enacting their own bankruptcy laws.106 Congress at first displayed no
initiative in exercising the power.107
For the first hundred years of the country’s history, Congress
passed temporary bankruptcy acts to respond to economic crises.108 A
1796 banking crisis resulted in the 1800 Bankruptcy Act, which
granted limited protections to wealthy merchants until its expiration in
1803.109 Congress next exercised the power in 1841 to respond to the
103

See infra notes 105-157 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105-157 and accompanying text.
105
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
106
See Koffler, supra note 6, at 35–37 (describing early history of federal
bankruptcy law). States retained and experimented with their bankruptcy powers
until 1819, when the Supreme Court ruled state discharge laws unconstitutional. See
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819).
107
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 10 (1935)
(quoting William Smith of South Carolina as saying that bankruptcy legislation was
too “intricate and perplexing” for the Congress of 1790); see also Koffler, supra
note 6, at 41–47 (describing bankruptcy debate and legislation from 1790 to 1841).
108
See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14–21 (1995); Todd J. Zywicki, The Past,
Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2018
(2003).
109
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19,
1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was not meant as a general
social safety net. See Tabb, supra note, at 14–15. The Panic of 1797 had ruined
founding father Robert Morris, among other prominent Americans. See id. Morris,
who had personally financed much of the Revolutionary War and constructed the
104
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Panic of 1837.110 This time, needing to protect small businesses and
family farmers, Congress allowed voluntary commencement of cases
by “all persons whatsoever.”111 The 1841 Act was repealed in 1843,
apparently having served its purpose.112 Congress returned to the
subject only in 1867, when it passed comprehensive legislation
necessary to address the Panic of 1857 and the economic collapse and
political reintegration of the former Confederacy.113 The 1867 Act
expired in 1878, and Congress enacted no bankruptcy laws for twenty
years thereafter.114
The early bankruptcy laws carried little in the way of
exemptions. The 1800 and 1841 Acts allowed limited exemptions for
personal property such as bedding and tools, and may have operated
in tandem with evolving state exemptions.115 The 1867 Act
incorporated state homestead exemptions at their 1864 levels.116
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first federal law to be
passed not in reaction to an economic crisis, but as an adaptation to

new nation’s currency and banking system, had retired from government and
leveraged his fortune via frontier real estate investments. See id.; Fredrick P. Corbit,
The Founding Fathers’ Influence on Bankruptcy Law, 26-AUG AM. BANKR. INST. J.
50, 51 (2007). His bankruptcy was considered a profound embarrassment to his
legacy and to the nation itself, which responded with a bankruptcy act intended as a
limited bailout. See id.
110
See Tabb, supra note 108, at 16–18.
111
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843,
ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
112
Id.; see Warren, supra note 107, at 81–82 (noting that over thirty thousand
debtors filed bankruptcy and received discharges in less than 18 months).
113
See Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat.
99 (1878); Tabb, supra note 108, at 18–21. In fact, the 1867 act included a specific
provision requiring “all citizens of the United States petitioning to be declared
bankrupt shall on filing such petition, and before any proceedings thereon, take and
sub-scribe an oath of allegiance and fidelity, to the United States, which oath
petition, shall be filed and recorded with the proceedings in bankruptcy.” Ch. 176,
14 Stat. 517.
114
Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878); see Tabb, supra note 108, at
21.
115
See 2 Stat. 19, 5 Stat. 440.
116
14 Stat. 517, 522–23 (1867). Thus, Confederate and Reconstruction
exemptions would not apply. Warren, supra note 107, at 110–11. These restrictions
were relaxed over time. See Ch. 339, 17 Stat. 334 (1872); Kener v. La Grange
Mills, 231 U.S. 215, 217 (1913).
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economic growth.117 By that time, large corporations dominated the
transportation, communication, and manufacturing sectors of the
national economy; furthermore, such corporations owed and held
loans across state boundaries.118 The new federal law provided
procedures for individual discharge and corporate wind-downs that
allowed for fair debt collection and rehabilitation while minimizing
impact on the larger economy.119 It is considered the beginning of
modern bankruptcy law.120
The 1898 Act eliminated federal exemptions and fully
incorporated all state exemptions, leaving debtors in non-exemption
states at the mercy of their creditors.121 The act was amended
comprehensively during the Great Depression, to streamline

117

See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
AMERICA 35–43 (2001); Tabb, supra note 108, at 23–26 (noting effect of
financial crises in 1884 and 1893 but describing shift of debate toward permanent
legislation).
118
See Zywicki, supra note 108, at 2019 (detailing extent of corporate and
industrial growth in the late 19th century as precedent to bankruptcy reform).
119
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); Tabb,
supra note 108, at 23–28; Skeel, supra note 117 at 35–43 (noting growing impact of
national corporations and interstate debts in the late 19th century and resulting
requirement of comprehensive bankruptcy laws); see also Garrard Glenn, The Basis
of the Federal Receivership, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 434, 436–46 (1925) (describing
legal issues with the system of equity receivership that preceded and coincided with
early corporate bankruptcy laws and facilitated some corporate reorganizations);
D.H. Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receiverships, 10 HARV. L. REV. 139, 142–43
(1896) (same). The 1867 act had provided some protections for corporations. 14
Stat. at 534–35. Initially under the 1898 act, corporations were only eligible for
involuntary filings. 30 Stat. at 547. This changed in 1910. Ch. 412, § 3, 36 Stat. at
839 (1910). Reorganization capability was added during the Great Depression. Act
of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 912–25; see also Tabb, supra note 108, at
23–30 (describing decades-long debate and legislation regarding reorganization for
farms, railroads, and other corporations).
120
See Skeel, supra note 117 at 43; Zywicki, supra note 108, at 2019–20
(reviewing Skeel) (noting that unanticipated but equally influential effects of the
law included its benefits to debtors and bankruptcy attorneys); see also generally
David A. Skeel, The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321
(1999) (cautioning against the view of the 1898 act as inevitable and explaining its
passage and longevity via a confluence of political factors).
121
Ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. at 548. Although there was an attempt to protect
individual debtors from excessive court fees, even this was apparently intended as a
favor to creditors, as it maximized estate payout. See Skeel, supra note 120, at 332.
IN
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procedures and facilitate corporate reorganization.122 It remained
intact until 1978, though occasionally altered by case law and some
discrete statutory amendments.123
The primary innovation of 20th century insolvency law was the
idea of bankruptcy not as a moral and financial punishment, but as a
policy tool to encourage socially productive behavior.124 In Local
Loan v. Hunt in 1934, the Supreme Court noted that bankruptcy
“gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor…a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."125 This ethos, now known as the
debtor’s “fresh start,” developed along with statutory and case law for
several decades.126 It is now viewed as equally important or more
122

E.g., Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; see Tabb, supra note 108,
at 27–32 (describing reforms between 1898 and 1978).
123
See Tabb, supra note 108, at 27–32.
124
See Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing cases interpreting
the purpose of the 1898 bankruptcy act as being the restoration of citizens to
economic productivity); Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal
World, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1, 75 (2002) (noting that bankruptcy has a social insurance
function that encourages debtor risk-taking in amoral terms); Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 32–34 (1986) (noting that bankruptcy law derives
its moral and legal rhetoric from a legal tradition by which “credit could be morally
affirmative, the currency of trust and honor by which virtuous merchants bound
themselves”); cf. James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial Regulation,
15 HARV. L. REV. 829, 843 (1902) (“While the humanitarian or relief features are
meritorious, it should be constantly borne in mind that this principle of the law is
merely an incident to its main purpose, and should not prove a menace to the
permanency of a system intended for the perpetual benefit of merchants in
general”). Note that bankruptcy is not and has never been morally neutral. See Local
Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (requiring debtors to be “honest but unfortunate” to gain
discharge); see generally Korobkin, supra note 50 (noting at 2154–55 that “the
debtor publicly stages his own powerlessness to change circumstances; he displays
that his seeking to avoid his debts cannot be a moral choice, for he lacks the agency
to choose. At the same time, in order to prove worthy of forgiveness, the debtor
must submit himself to the moral inventory embodied in the rules governing the
granting or denial of discharge. By these various forms of surrender and submission,
the debtor struggles to separate himself from the characterological implications of
his bankruptcy filing, and thereby qualifies the meaning of the social breach that he
is concurrently committing”).
125
Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (citing previous cases to the same effect).
126
See Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1117–28 (describing pre-BAPCPA legislative
debate over fresh start ideology); see, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549
U.S. 365, 371–76 (2007) (holding that the “fresh start” implies a requirement of
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important than the principle of equitable and efficient distribution of
the debtor’s property to creditors.127
2. The 1978 Bankruptcy Act and BAPCPA
a. The Fresh Start, the 1978 Act, and Resulting Criticism
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 enshrined the fresh start,
expanding the relief available to debtors in the form of exemptions for
assets viewed as necessary for the sustenance of the debtor’s
economic and social life.128 It provided a set of federal exemptions for
debtor property, which operated in tandem with applicable nonbankruptcy property protections.129 The act also recognized state
exemptions, and furthermore allowed states to “opt out” of the federal
exemptions in favor of their own.130 Thirty-some states opted out; the

debtor good faith where a debtor attempts to convert from chapter 7 to chapter 13);
Grogan, 498 U.S. 279 at 286–87 (holding that the “fresh start” policy does not
require a debtor-friendly burden of proof where creditors show fraud in order to bar
discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)). NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
528 (1984) (noting that “[t]he fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a
debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible
misuse of economic resources”).
127
Compare Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367 (“[t]he principal purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start”’), with Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151, 161 (1991) (observing “the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor”).
128
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 117–18 (1977) (describing Congressional
intent); Koffler, supra note 6, at 31–32. More generally, scholars after 1978 agree
that bankruptcy plays a central role in restoring the debtor’s physical and emotional
health as well, thus creating an environment to encourage debtor entrepreneurship.
See generally John M. Carnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393 (2000) (theorizing bankruptcy as
fostering debtor entrepreneurship); Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance
Function of Consumer Bankrutptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (2005)
(illustrating the role of bankruptcy in debtors’ physical, mental, and financial health,
and situating bankruptcy among other government social programs).
129
See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 § 522 (1978)
(codified as amended in 11 U.S.C.)
130
See id.
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remainder allowed debtors to choose the preferable set of
exemptions.131
The 1978 Act drew heavy criticism on three accounts:
First, the high dollar limits of some state exemptions allowed
wealthy, high-profile debtors to maintain their wealth while
discharging millions of dollars of debt brought on by their own
recklessness and criminality.132 Critics worried that malefactors such
as Enron and Tyco executives and accused murderer O.J. Simpson
would be able to shield their wealth from victims with homes in
Florida and Texas.133 This problem was commonly known as the
“millionaire’s mansion” loophole.134
Second, and similarly, many commentators and lenders feared
that the 1978 exemptions were too permissive of debtors who
intentionally transferred wealth into exempt assets in contemplation of
bankruptcy.135

131

Compare Kemner, supra note 4, at 687 (noting thirty-nine states had opted
out by 1991), with CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 9.16, at
688 (1997) (noting thirty-five opt-outs by 1997).
132
See, e.g., David J. Morrow, Key to a Cozier Bankruptcy: Location, Location,
Location, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A1; Philip Shenon, Home Exemptions Snag
Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A1; Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20.
133
See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Enron's Many Strands: Home As Shield From
Creditors Is Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2002, at A1 (quoting political
sources); Megan Mcardle, How OJ Simpson May Help Keep Dick Fuld From
Stiffing His Shareholders, The Atlantic, Jan. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/01/how-oj-simpson-may-helpkeep-dick-fuld-from-stiffing-his-shareholders/4625/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014)
(describing how fears over Simpson’s plan to shelter assets under Florida exemption
law led to BAPCPA reforms). These concerns were probably for naught: neither
O.J. Simpson nor any of the best known Enron executives actually did file for
bankruptcy protection. At the time, however, a number of famous people were in
fact filing for bankruptcy, raising questions about the moral righteousness of the
system for those whose notoriety indicated prospective earning power. See Melissa
B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the
Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1323–28
(2002).
134
See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. H1993-2048 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner); see also Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1128–36 (summarizing
media coverage).
135
See sources cited supra notes 133-134.
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Third, combined with state variations in dollar limits on
exemptions, it appeared possible for debtors to “forum shop” by
transferring wealth to debtor-friendly states prior to bankruptcy.136
The statistical significance of these concerns was probably
minimal.137 They gave rise, however, to serious complaints about the
fairness of the bankruptcy system.138 Deference to state law seemed to
disproportionately benefit wealthy debtors.139
Perhaps more importantly, the late 20th century saw dramatic
growth in credit availability to the American public.140 The
combination of heightened lending activity and debtor-friendly
bankruptcy legislation caused lenders increasing concern that the
bankruptcy discharge would be abused by free-spending
profligates.141 Scholars worried that the risks of credit market
distortion—as lenders raised interest rates to counterbalance default
risk in high-limit exemption states—outweighed the benefits of
consumer protection.142 Statistics showed some basis for concern,
136

See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy:
A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824–28 (1987) (responding to Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987)).
137
See infra notes 228-255 and accompanying text.
138
See generally Jacoby, supra note 77 (describing public criticism of the 1978
law leading to the enactment of BAPCPA).
139
See sources cited, supra notes 133-134.
140
See Federal Reserve, “Consumer Credit Outstanding,” available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_sa_levels.html
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2014) (showing growth in outstanding consumer credit from $262
billion in 1978 to $2.2 trillion in 2005).It is unlikely that either expanding credit
markets or bankruptcy laws caused the other; rather, technological and policy
innovations encouraged both developments.
141
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2–8 (2005) (introducing the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as a comprehensive
package of reform measures pertaining to both consumer and business bankruptcy
cases); See generally Jacoby, supra note 77 (providing numerous examples of
criticism); see generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485
(2005) (describing actions of coalition of consumer creditors that collaborated to
effect passage of BAPCPA); More cynically, one might argue that lenders saw no
real risk of abuse; rather, that they acknowledged bankruptcy filings as profit loss
and exercised their lobbying power to maximize profit.
142
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and
Bankruptcy Policy, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 413–16 (2006); Richard
Posner, The Bankruptcy Reform Act, The Becker-Posner Blog (Mar. 27, 2005),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/03/the-bankruptcy-reform-act--
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although the data actually indicated that high exemption limits mostly
just prompted credit companies to charge higher rates to poor families
that had no homestead equity to exempt in the first place.143
Regardless, these worries resulted in lobbying for more uniform laws,
and after nearly a decade of debate, Congressed passed BAPCPA.144
b. BAPCPA, Exemption Reform, and the Law Today
BAPCPA severely limited the ability of debtors to alter their
financial structure to maximize exemption amounts. After BAPCPA,
state exemptions were still recognized and states could continue to opt
out of existing federal exemptions.145 However, BAPCPA installed
five distinct look-back periods with which courts could limit or forbid
a debtor’s exemptions:
1. If the debtor has not lived in the same state continuously for
two years, they may not qualify for that state’s exemption.146
posner.html (“[c]ritics have derided [BAPCPA] as mean-spirited and hard on the
poor, but they overlook the most important effect that the bill is likely to have, and
that is to reduce interest rates”).
143
See Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households with
Nothing to Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 493, 517 (2006) (employing data
from Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and
Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. ECON. 217 (1997)).
144
See In re Feddersen, 355 B.R. 738, 743 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006) (“Congress
had ample time and the input of a resourceful and vocal secured creditor lobby to
effectuate its intent”); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 868, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2006)
(“secured and unsecured creditors' lobbies were represented during the drafting and
enactment of BAPCPA”); Bradford W. Botes, New Bankruptcy Filing Strategies in
a Post-BAPCPA Era, in UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF BAPCPA: LEADING
LAWYERS ON EXAMINING BAPCPA CHANGES, ADOPTING NEW FILING STRATEGIES,
AND ANALYZING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY TRENDS 43, 43 (“BAPCPA was bought
and paid for by bankers and credit card company lobbyists whose intention was to
wring every drop of money out of people seeking bankruptcy protection”); Jensen,
supra note 141, at 498–99; Barry Rehfeld, Top Creditor Lobbyist Tassey Goes for
Broke,
Am.
Banker,
(May
17,
2001,
at
1:00
AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/166_95/-149969-1.html (explaining origins
of BAPCPA language and structure in a report produced by a top creditor lobbyist);
see also Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 102 (1997) (noting that prior to the 1978 act,
“[c]reditors may also have tried to use the opportunity of exemption reform to gain
competitive advantages in the credit market”).
145
11 U.S.C. § 522(2011).
146
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (2012).
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2. If the debtor has not satisfied the two-year continuity
requirement above, the court looks to the state of domicile in the six
month period preceding that two-year period.147
3. If the debtor has acquired a new homestead within 1,215
days (3 years, four months) of filing, the value of the exemption is
limited to the value of the debtor’s previous homestead plus
$125,000.148
4. If the debtor is a convicted felon or has debts resulting from
securities violations, fraud, intentional torts, or other serious offenses
listed in section 522(q) of the Code, the exemption is limited to
$125,000 regardless of applicable state law.149
5. If the debtor’s actions in the ten years prior to the filing
evidence intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the court has
discretion to reduce the exemption proportionately.150
Even after BAPCPA, a significant amount of criticism has
focused on the perceived non-uniformity of bankruptcy laws.151
Scholars and creditors’ advocates have argued forcefully against the
deference of federal law to state law in the area of exemptions.152
These arguments fall into three categories. First, that state laws are
ineffective and overly diverse, leading to unfair results.153 Second,
147

See id. In other words, the court looks to “the first six months of the period
beginning precisely two and one-half years prior to the bankruptcy filing” in order
to ascertain whether the debtor might be eligible for an exemption in that state. See
Tarvin, supra note 6, at 154–55. If that sounds overly complicated, arbitrary, and
potentially harmful, it’s because it is. See generally Tarvin, supra note 6.
148
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2012). Note that what kinds of ‘interest’ count as
part of that $125,000 was for a time a matter of disagreement among the courts. See
Wallace v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 513 F.3d 212, 217–23 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing
case law). Courts were unsure whether an ‘interest’ might include purchase of title,
or acquisition of any type of equity. See Pratt, supra note 6, at 102–03. This appears
resolved in favor of the former following a Circuit-level reversal of the most
prominent ‘equity interest’ case. See Greene v. Savage (In re Greene), 583 F.3d 614,
618–25 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the 1,215-day look-back period asks whether the
debtor purchased title to the property during the period, as opposed to adding to its
equity value or altering its status as a homestead. See id. at 625; Rogers, 513 F.3d at
223.
149
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(q) (2012).
150
See id. § 522(o).
151
See sources cited, supra note 9.
152
See id.
153
See sources cited, supra note 12.
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that the language and/or intent of the Constitution require absolutely
uniform federal control over bankruptcy law.154 Third, that nonuniformity encourages debtors to forum shop and transfer wealth to
exempt assets in order to abuse the discharge.155 Part III of this Article
will describe and analyze these arguments in detail.156 Part IV will
present two counter-arguments in favor of limited deference to state
exemption laws.157
III.

THE UNIFORMITY MOVEMENT

Creditors’ advocates and some scholars have raised three
significant arguments against the centuries-old policy of deference to
state exemptions in bankruptcy. This Part addresses and dismisses
each argument individually.158 Section A of this Part discusses the
claim that deference to arcane laws leads to inequitable results.159
Section B describes the controversy over constitutional language and
intent.160 Section C discusses the claim that pre- and post-BAPCPA
bankruptcy law facilitates irresponsible debtor behavior.161
A. Fairness Critiques Survive Despite Expansive Judicial Powers
Contrary to some claims,162 judicial and legislative authority
effectively safeguards the fairness of the bankruptcy process.

154

See sources cited, supra note 13.
See sources cited, supra note 11.
156
See infra notes 158-255 and accompanying text.
157
See infra notes 257-280 and accompanying text.
158
See infra notes 158-255 and accompanying text.
159
See infra notes 162-191 and accompanying text.
160
See infra notes 192-227 and accompanying text.
161
See infra notes 228-255 and accompanying text.
162
See sources cited, supra notes 6-13 (debating merits of state exemption
policy); supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing examples of arcane
language and scholarly debate regarding fairness). This Article will restrict its focus
on the issue of fairness to the question of fairness to debtors. In the consumer
context, creditors have greater bargaining power, the ability to adjust lending
practices and interest rates, and complete information about state and federal debtorcreditor laws. Furthermore, the practice of debtor forum shopping and discharge
abuse is not statistically significant. See infra notes 228-255 and accompanying text.
Thus, in statistically relevant consumer circumstances, creditors receive what they
bargain for. The situation is not unfair to creditors, regardless of its political merits.
155
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Furthermore, bankruptcy is in fact more uniform and equitable than its
detractors would likely admit. This Section will document two areas
of case law that demonstrate the evolution of statutory and case law
toward effective bankruptcy policy.163 Subsection 1 addresses whether
courts should grant exempt status to cash proceeds as substitutes for
damaged exempt assets.164 Subsection 2 describes the ongoing statelaw policy battle over exemptions for mobile homes.165
1. The Proceeds Problem
In re Plant and In re Gilley, cited in the Introduction to this
Article, serve as examples of a specific problem in exemption policy.
In brief, state exemptions guarantee protection for some assets, thus
inducing debtors into economic behaviors that might otherwise be too
risky. But if those assets are damaged by no fault of the debtor, the
debtor is often reimbursed, and the proceeds—insurance or court
judgments—are often not protected by statute.166
At first glance, the failure of the federal and state legislatures
to protect debtor proceeds appears as a deep flaw in the bankruptcy
system. The conflicting elements of the statutory regimes leave
debtors unable to access statutory protections previously granted. A
closer look, however, reveals broad agreement in reasoning and little
real controversy.167 In effect, by granting judges and states discretion
As to the fairness of particular value limits of state exemptions, this Article
takes no position. Value limits of exemptions represent a balance of state policies,
with land development and insolvency protection on one side and moral
chastisement, creditor protection, and lower consumer lending rates on the other.
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
163
See infra notes 162-191 and accompanying text.
164
See infra notes 166–176 and accompanying text.
165
See infra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
166
See, e.g., Plant, 300 B.R. at 22, 24 (noting lack of statutory protection for
proceeds in Arizona); In re Simpson, 238 B.R. 776, 779 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999)
(noting that Illinois law exempted the debtor’s “interest” in personal property, which
did not include insurance proceeds); Gilley, 236 B.R. at 446–47 (discussing
exemption case law as evolved from Florida constitutional law).
167
The most real controversy between courts on the issue of changes to asset
character appears when debtors die after filing their petition. On the one side are
cases saying that the debtor can’t fulfill the purpose of the exemption. See, e.g.,
Wiesner, 267 B.R. at 38 (“debtor is deceased; he cannot benefit from the fresh start
bankruptcy was intended to provide, nor will the exempted assets give him the
foundation upon which to build his start”). On the other side are cases saying that
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to employ their own methods, Congress has protected the uniform
bankruptcy virtue of the debtor’s fresh start.168
Judicial deference is important because there are limits to
statutory protection. For instance, Massachusetts would exempt the
insurance payment as a substitute for home equity.169 But imagine if
Deborah Debtor loses her home in a flood after a dam breaks, and she
has no flood insurance. Instead, she receives a $300,000 settlement
check from the utility company that caused the damage through
negligent construction of the dam. Under current Massachusetts
statutory law, the restitution check for the utility’s involuntary
conversion of Deborah’s property would still be available to
Deborah’s creditors.170
In fact, under common law there are strong protections of
debtor assets in this situation. Throughout the states, bankruptcy
courts have explicitly171 or implicitly172 required debtors to satisfy a
three-pronged test to maintain exemptions in proceeds as substitutes
for the damaged exempt asset: (1) the debtor must evidence an intent
to reinvest the proceeds to repair or replace the asset;173 (2) the

property once exempt is no longer property of the estate. See Reed, 184 B.R. at
737–38.
168
Some states employ a combination of statutory and case law to ensure
fairness in such situations. See, e.g., White v. Brown (In re White), 389 B.R. 693,
697 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (implying good faith reinvestment requirement into
Arizona exemption allowing rollover of sale proceeds); Hoffpauir, 258 B.R. at 456–
57 (interpreting Idaho exemption statute, which exempted some proceeds, to also
exempt alleged ‘surplus’ resulting from asset appreciation and insurance payment
calculated for replacement value as opposed to market value); Orange Brevard, 137
So. 2d at 206 (describing conditions by which proceeds may be exempted pursuant
to Florida’s constitution). Others, such as Massachusetts, now attempt to provide
protections within statutory law. See Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, §1 (2010); Dion,
supra note 97, at 123.
169
See Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2010) (defining “home” to include
proceeds of insurance policies).
170
See id.
171
The multi-prong test is explicit in Florida. See Binko, 258 B.R. at 517.
172
See infra notes 173-175 (providing case examples).
173
See, e.g., White, 389 B.R. at 697 (denying exemption where proceeds could
not be identified as a result of debtor’s risky and complicated investments);
Wiesner, 267 B.R. at 32, 38 (removing exemption where debtor’s death in fire that
destroyed homestead also eliminated possibility of reinvestment); See, e.g., Binko,
258 B.R. at 517 (stating requirement). This prong includes a duty to keep the
proceeds identifiable as proceeds of damage to equity. See, e.g., White, 389 B.R. at
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debtor’s conduct must evidence good faith;174 and (3) in the case of
insurance or litigation proceeds, the proceeds must arise from
demonstrable damage to the debtor’s equity position.175 Satisfying
these prongs, debtors see their proceeds exempt.
This three-prong test demonstrates that the uniform
bankruptcy goal of the debtor’s fresh start transcends variations in
state law. In all cases identified in the research for this Article, judges
granted exemptions consistent with fresh start principles, regardless of
697 (citing explicit requirement in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1101(C) (2014));
Binko, 258 B.R. at 517; Ziegler, 239 B.R. at 375, 379.
174
See Hannigan v. White (In re Hannigan), 409 F.3d 480, 481 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“a bankruptcy court has discretion to deny the amendment of exemptions where the
amendment would prejudice creditors or where the debtor has acted in bad faith or
concealed assets”); see, e.g., Thurston, No. 99-11836-JNF, 2007 WL 1860892, at
*13 (denying exemption where debtor’s actions showed concealment of assets);
Binko, 258 B.R. at 517 (stating requirement); Ziegler, 239 B.R. at 379 (stating good
faith requirement and denying exemption on such grounds); Gilley, 236 B.R. at 446
(granting exemption upon conclusion of debtor’s good faith).
175
See, e.g., Plant, 300 B.R. at 24 (denying exemption where “there is no
evidence to support any decline in the value of the Debtor's homestead as a result of
Jentra's negligence”); Simpson, 238 B.R. at 779–81 (denying exemption of
insurance proceeds for automobile because Illinois law regarded insurance contracts
as private indemnities running separate from the asset itself; therefore, proceeds
could not operate as a substitute for an exempt asset); Gilley, 236 B.R. at 443–44
(granting exemption where “[t]he property was contaminated as a result of the use
of Benlate, and is not now suitable for growing either strawberries or the other crops
previously raised on the property”). Simpson is a fascinating test case of this prong
in that the court actually noted the apparent unfairness of its decision but chalked it
up to the debtor’s timing in filing for bankruptcy:
“While it is unfortunate the debtor here must forego the full
benefit of his motor vehicle exemption simply because of the
happenstance of the timing of the accident and the insurer's payment
of his claim, the debtor's bankruptcy filing was a voluntary act that
was subject to his control and timing, even though the accident was
not. Having availed himself of the protections and privileges afforded
by the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor cannot complain about the limits
imposed by its provisions.” Simpson, 238 B.R. at 780–81.
The court implied that if the accident that damaged the debtor’s vehicle had
occurred after the filing, the result might have changed. See id. In other words, as
long as the choice of law belonged entirely to the court, the fresh start principle
would govern. This case probably differs from others herein cited because it
concerns a motor vehicle exemption. Motor vehicles are more easily replaceable
than homesteads; thus, the debtor’s choice to file for bankruptcy before replacing
his vehicle may have signaled a desire to maintain the cash proceeds instead of
reinvesting.
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state law requirements and despite substantial discussion thereof.
Judicial reasoning is not always explicit on these points, and some
minor controversies remain.176 However, there is little doubt that
where the general fairness of bankruptcy law is concerned,
bankruptcy judges do not tolerate arcane or misguided state laws that
would grant windfalls to undeserving parties.177
2. The Mobile Home Controversy
Another example of theoretically arcane or unfair state laws
can be found in the controversy over whether mobile homes should
qualify as homesteads for purposes of exemption. Historically,
legislators and judges considered ownership of land and the
construction of permanent buildings thereon to be intrinsic elements
of citizenship, family life, and economically productive behavior.178
The times, however, have changed, and not all states have changed
their statutory definitions of homesteads to suit changing economic
realities.179
Mobile homes are generally considered personal property.180
The debtor owns the structure, which is moveable, though perhaps not
176

See, e.g., supra note 167 (describing controversy over effect of debtor’s
post-petition death on exemption status); supra note 175 (describing variation in law
based on timing of debtor filing relative to asset damage).
177
This is not to suggest that bad laws are acceptable because judges do not
enforce them. Recall that exemptions are typically state laws that operate both
inside and outside bankruptcies. In the bankruptcy context, judges may override
laws that unfairly conflict with bankruptcy principles on a factual basis using their
equitable authority.
178
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (describing historical
importance of land ownership in American life).
179
See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. IX, § 3 (defining homestead without regard to
particular definitions); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (2014) (exempting only
property fully owned by the debtor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (2014) (exempting
“dwelling house[s]” and land) see generally Robert Laurence, Mobile Homesteads,
and in Particular the Exempt Status of Mobile Homes Located on Rented Lots: The
Laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah Compared and the Principle of
the Liberal Construction of Exemption Statutes Analyzed, 57 ARK. L. REV. 221
(2004) (describing relationship between statutory and common law mobile home
exemptions in several states).
180
See Dion, supra note 97, at 112; Laurence, supra note 179, at 231–32;
Summary of State Laws and Court Cases Regarding the Zoning, Placement, and Tax
Treatment
of
Manufactured
Housing
,
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easily. The debtor usually rents a piece of land on which the home is
situated.181
Courts acknowledge that for purposes of functionality to the
debtor, the mobile home serves a purpose similar to that of a
traditional homestead.182 The value of the home, however, often
exceeds the dollar limit for statutory exemptions on personal
property.183 Denial of exemption thus could force debtors to choose
between their homes and their personal belongings. Recognizing this
identity of purpose, and needing to protect the low-income families
that tend to reside in mobile homes, some states began to introduce
statutory protections in the mid-20th century.184
The process has been slow and remains incomplete with
respect to statutory law.185 It is further complicated by the complex
interactions in many states between state constitutions, statutes, and
case law.186 For instance, under the definition contained in 11 U.S.C.
http://www.manufacturedhousing.org/lib/showtemp_detail.asp?id=606&a
(last
visited Jan. 28, 2015).
181
See Dion, supra note 97, at 112; Regina Lewis, Quick Tips: Mobile Homes
as Lower-Cost Housing, USA Today, Aug. 8, 2013, 8:49 PM,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/08/03/money-quicktips-mobile-homes-hosuing/2610469/.
182
See, e.g., In re Carlson 303 B.R. 478, 487 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (finding
exemption of mobile home on leased property consistent with legislative purposes);
Gray, 378 B.R. at 730–36 (finding ambiguity in Massachusetts statute that could be
resolved with reference to legislative intent to protect home structures); In re
Buzzell, 110 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (holding that exemption
definitions turn on debtor use, not structure identity).
183
See Lewis, supra note 181 (noting typical mobile home costs between
$25,000 and $100,000). Personal property exemptions are typically well under
$20,000. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (2012) (allowing aggregate exemption of
$8,000 in personal property).
184
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a)(4) (2011); 1979 Kan. Sess. Laws 868.
Common law mobile home exemptions preceded statutory exemptions in some
cases by several decades. See, e.g., In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843, 846–47 (D. Neb.
1951); In re Williams, 24 F. Supp. 440, 441 (D. Or. 1938); Clark v. Vitz, 190
S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). At least one scholar called for uniform
mobile home exemptions as early as 1950. See George L. Haskins, Homestead
Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1950) (“if the function of homestead
legislation is protection of the home, it should be immaterial whether the home is a
mere chattel or has achieved the dignity of an estate in land or a chattel real”).
185
See Laurence, supra note 179, at 226 (describing failure of state law to
protect mobile homeowners as “basic foolishness”).
186
See id.
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§ 522(p), a mobile home could qualify for a homestead exemption of
up to $22,975.187 This exemption would be inapplicable, however, in
opt-out states that grant no homestead status to mobile homes.188
Thus, in some states, mobile homeowners in bankruptcy are at risk of
losing their homes despite federal laws and otherwise liberally
construed exemptions.
The failure to exempt mobile homes discriminates against a
large portion of the population.189 Mobile homeowners are
disproportionately poor and are often priced out of real estate
ownership.190 Ownership of a permanent home on rented real estate
may be the best substitute. Thus, as with the proceeds problem
described in the previous subsection, this loophole may effectively
prevent debtors from re-entering the housing market, and force them
to rely on other forms of government assistance.
It is not clear whether states benefit from this exemption
decision. On the one hand, states may wish to refrain from exempting
mobile homes to encourage those who can possibly own their own
property to do so. On the other hand, if land ownership is not possible
for a large section of the population, states without mobile home
exemptions effectively deny debt relief to their poorer citizens. As a
result, the states may see an increased need for expensive social
services, as well as increases in the costly problems that more
generally arise from a lack of affordable housing.
As with proceeds, courts have struggled to reconcile mobile
home exemptions with the fundamental precepts of federal
bankruptcy law.191 Although this situation may be non-uniform, it is
an example of the federalist system working as designed. Unlike with
the proceeds issue, the mobile home controversy reflects a genuine
state legislative concern over fundamental values such as land
ownership and the social safety net. A decision to limit exemptions
187

See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012) (granting homestead exemption in “real
property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence”) (emphasis added). The dollar amount is adjusted every three years based
on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, published by the
Department of Labor. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (2012). The amount cited was most recently
adjusted on April 1, 2014.
188
See Laurence, supra note 179, at 225–26.
189
See id.
190
See id.
191
See sources cited, supra notes 179–184.
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for mobile homes does not allow creditors to gain windfalls from
misfortunes beyond the debtor’s control. It merely attempts to
encourage a certain type of economic behavior. Such policy
objectives merit deference to state law.
A. Addressing Constitutional Concerns
This section analyzes the claims of some scholars that stateby-state variation is per se abhorrent to the bankruptcy system.192
Subsection 1 describes and dismisses the constitutional arguments for
uniform bankruptcy law.193 Subsection 2 addresses the related claims
of some scholars that federal uniformity in bankruptcy law would be
strategically advantageous.194
1. The Words and Intentions of the Founders
Judges and scholars have occasionally struggled with the
theory of the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution as evidence that
state-by-state variation in treatment of parties in bankruptcy should
not be tolerated.195 The text of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy.196 The meaning of
‘uniformity’ in any constitutional context is the subject of some
debate.197

192

See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Austin, supra
note 9, at 1166–68 (arguing that some exemption laws are unconstitutional);
Koffler, supra note 6, at 23–28 (describing the “constitutional mandate” of
uniformity and critiquing the exemption provisions of the 1978 act); López, supra
note 6, at 166 (describing state laws as violating the spirit of the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments and representing Congress’s abdication of the bankruptcy
clause); Stechschulte, supra note 97, at 782 (declaring state exemption laws
unconstitutional).
193
See infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
194
See infra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
195
See, e.g., Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (noting
requirement of “geographic” uniformity); Austin, supra note 9, at 1166–68; Koffler,
supra note 6, at 106 (describing non-uniformity under the 1978 act as a “serious
disorder afflicting our Constitution”); López, supra note 6, at 166; Stechschulte,
supra note 9, at 782 (declaring certain state exemption laws unconstitutional).
196
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
197
See Austin, supra note 9, at 1141–63; Koffler, supra note 6, at 77–87.
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One concern is that the word “uniform” appears in only two
other contexts in the Constitution—taxation198 and naturalization.199
Courts have interpreted the word inconsistently in those contexts. 200
But bankruptcy is not similar to taxation or naturalization, which
concern rights and obligations under federal law. By contrast, the
Constitution leaves property law generally to the states.201 What little
information we have about the intent of the bankruptcy clause
indicates that “uniformity” in bankruptcy was merely meant to
coordinate bankruptcy procedures so as to facilitate interstate
commerce.202
The Supreme Court has mostly disregarded these concerns for
two reasons. First, the Court noted in 1902 that the then-current
Bankruptcy Code and its relevant forebears were in fact uniform, in
that they assign to the debtor’s creditors everything contained within
the debtor’s estate.203 The assets relegated to the debtor’s estate are a
matter of local property law, not federal law.204 Thus, the Code is
uniform with respect to what Congress has placed under federal
purview.
Second, the Court has noted that the language of the
bankruptcy clause authorizes, but does not require, uniform

198

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 4.
200
See Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (allowing bankruptcy deference to state
exemption laws under concept that “uniformity is geographical”); Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 90 (1900) (requiring geographic uniformity for taxation,
without respect to state property laws); Nemetz v. INS INH, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir.
1981) (granting naturalization petition where petitioner was denied due to violation
of state anti-homosexuality law); Austin, supra note 9, at 1141–63; Koffler, supra
note 6, at 77–87.
201
See Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (noting that as a result of general federal
deference to state property law, bankruptcy uniformity does not contemplate
personal uniformity, i.e., similar results for all debtors regardless of location).
202
See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 377 (2006) (observing that
“the Framers, in adopting the Bankruptcy Clause, plainly intended to give Congress
the power to redress the rampant injustice resulting from States' refusal to respect
one another's discharge orders”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The
power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is . . . intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce”); Koffler, supra note 6, at 35–37 (describing early
legislative history, including relationship to national and international commerce).
203
See Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188–191.
204
Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979).
199
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bankruptcy laws.205 Indeed, for significant portions of the country’s
history, Congress has declined to exercise its bankruptcy power.206
When it has chosen to enact bankruptcy laws, those laws have been
uniform as to matters within federal purview, as noted above.
Courts have similarly refuted claims that the legislative history
or the intention of the framers demands absolute uniformity in the
area of exemptions.207 There is no evidence demonstrating that the
framers’ intentions were to seize all authority for the federal
government.208 What little evidence exists indicates that the framers
disliked the pre-constitutional situation, whereby discharges applied
on a state-by-state basis and thus debtors could be thrown in prison
upon crossing state lines.209 Perhaps most important in this debate,
however, is that there is practically no record of specifically what the
framers intended for federal bankruptcy law other than to resolve the
problem of cross-border discharge recognition.210 There was little
debate, no formal discussion, and certainly no intent to pass any
laws.211 Arguments as to bankruptcy uniformity on these grounds thus
appear highly speculative.
Some question exists as to whether the current regime
complies with the broad mandate of “geographic uniformity”
instituted by the Supreme Court in 1902.212 Some evidence suggests
that the Court returned to the issue in Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz in 2006.213 In that case, the Court held that sovereign
immunity doctrine did not prevent a trustee from suing a government

205

Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892) (noting that in the absence of
federal law, states may enact their own bankruptcy laws).
206
See supra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (describing pre-1978
legislative enactments).
207
See Katz, 546 U.S. at 377.
208
See id.; Koffler, supra note 6, at 35–37; supra notes 105-127 and
accompanying text (describing pre-1978 legislative enactments).
209
See Katz, 546 U.S. at 377; Tabb, supra note 108, at 13 (noting that
“bankruptcy received only passing attention from the framers at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787” but that the issue was considered necessary due to
discriminatory state laws).
210
See Olmstead, supra note 124, at 831; Tabb, supra note 108, at 13.
211
See Austin, supra note 9, at 1151–52; Tabb, supra note 108, at 13;
Olmstead, supra note 124, at 831.
212
See Austin, supra note 9, at 1157–68.
213
See id. at 1158–59.
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agency to avoid a preferential transfer.214 In an unnecessary and
perhaps poorly phrased footnote, the Court stated that “Congress has
the power to enact bankruptcy laws the purpose and effect of which
are to ensure uniformity in treatment of state and private creditors.”215
Read broadly, this could indicate a legal mandate to ensure complete
personal uniformity.216 But such a reading would have the Court
expressing disapproval of other areas of bankruptcy law generally
viewed as constitutional: for instance, Code section 507. In that
section, the Code provides priority distribution rights to some
creditors over others based on the origins of their claims.217 Those
claims may vary greatly due to the underlying state laws regulating
property rights.218 While scholars vigorously debate the merits of
priority laws per se, and the relative priority status of various creditor
types, neither scholars nor the courts object on constitutional grounds
to the disparate treatment of some creditors by merit of their state
status.219 This fact suggests that Katz should be interpreted narrowly,
and not applied to the issue of exemptions.
2. A Matter of Strategy?
On a related note, some scholars also argue that uniform
federal exemption control would be generally beneficial with regard
to public confidence in the Constitution.220 Scholarship in this vein
tends to focus on the duty of the federal government to provide due
214

Katz 546 U.S. at 378–79.
See id. at 377 n.13.
216
See Austin, supra note 9, at 1159 (“Pushed to its logical conclusion, this
would seem to require Congress to harmonize the bankruptcy laws so that the
treatment of parties in a bankruptcy case is indistinguishable from the standpoint of
geography”).
217
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2011).
218
See, e.g., id. § 507(a)(1) (granting first priority to claims based on domestic
support obligations). Because domestic relations laws vary greatly from state to
state, domestic support obligations will vary accordingly in bankruptcy.
Exemptions, like domestic support laws, are state-specific laws meant to determine
individual property rights and ensure their survival through citizens’ traumatic
experiences.
219
See generally Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C.L. REV. 375 (2014)
(weighing arguments for and against priority treatment for tax creditors).
220
See, e.g., Gotberg, supra note 9, at 233–45; Koffler, supra note 6, at 105–06
(analogizing proposed bankruptcy reforms to the Platonic ideals supposedly
espoused by the Framers); López, supra note 6, at 166.
215
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process and equal protection under the law.221 Some also cite potential
benefits to consumers and creditors due to increased fairness or the
perception thereof.222 Similarly, some scholars and attorneys argue
that complete federal control over bankruptcy would benefit
businesses by increasing the predictability and efficiency of legal
outcomes.223
With respect to consumer bankruptcy, strategic uniformity
arguments masquerade in constitutional language while espousing
highly ideological viewpoints irrelevant to real-life debtor and
creditor behaviors. Such arguments in fact ignore that consumers
routinely purchase products, sign contracts, and engage in
innumerable everyday functions unquestionably governed by statelevel commercial and property law.224 Furthermore, they choose to
enter bankruptcy proceedings in large part due to state-law nonbankruptcy concerns.225 Unlike in the business context, consumer
debtors can rarely shop for the best forum when they do file
bankruptcy or when disputes otherwise arise.226
221

See, e.g., Gotberg, supra note 9, at 235; López, supra note 6, at 166; see also
Storer, 58 F.3d at 1127–30 (holding state opt-out statutes constitutional).
222
See, e.g., Gotberg, supra note 9, at 235; López, supra note 6, at 166.
223
See, e.g., Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future,
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 11, 18–19 (1992) (arguing that a more uniform federal system
would decrease costs and increase predictability for businesses); Gotberg, supra
note 9, at 235 (same, citing Bugge). As Ms. Gotberg shows, there are worthy
arguments to be made for more uniformity in business bankruptcies. Her solution to
create a separate administrative agency for consumer bankruptcy is compelling, but
beyond the scope of this Article.
224
See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–57.
225
See, e.g., Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntrye, Explaining the Puzzle of CrossState Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 377–80 (2009) (noting
that wage garnishment laws correlate significantly to filing data).
226
See Juliet M. Moringiello, Has Congress Slimmed Down the Hogs?: A Look
at the BAPCPA Approach to Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, 15 WIDENER L.J. 615, 635–
39 (2006) (noting that high exemptions effectively help only high-asset, high-debt
creditors); cf. U.S. Courts, 2013 Bankruptcy Filings for 12-month Period Ending
Dec.
31,
2013,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings
/2013/1213_f2.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (showing that 70% of consumer
bankruptcies are filed under chapter 7). In recent history, about 95% of chapter 7
filings are no-asset cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE
L.J. 1, 18 (1996) (recounting historical progression toward commonality of no-asset
filing); NAT'L BANKR. REV. COM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS,
FINAL REPORT 137 (1997).
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Debtors’ property law requirements are, indeed, local.227
Moreover, they vary based on geography, cultural values, and cost of
living. Federal uniformity cannot account for the localized needs of
consumer debtors, because bankruptcy is so closely tied to localized
property law. Thus, federal uniformity would deprive consumers of
the benefits of their bargains in the short term, and of the increased
flexibility of state variation in the long term. For these reasons as well
as the mere impracticality of trampling upon two hundred years of
deference to state law, Congress has made the “strategic” decision not
to sledgehammer all states into exemption uniformity.
A. Do State Exemptions Create Poor Debtor Incentives?
The argument that the state exemption system encourages
financial irresponsibility and abuse of the bankruptcy discharge
likewise falls flat. This section addresses the claims of creditors’
advocates and shows that exemption abuse has never been a
statistically significant problem.228 Moral outrage aside,229 the biggest
policy concern on the exemption issue should be the tradeoff between
debtor protections in bankruptcy and consumer interest rates outside
bankruptcy.230
Data collected by the government and the scholarly
community belies the most prominent arguments for exemption
uniformity. When bankruptcy reform became a prominent topic of
discussion in the mid-1990s, much attention focused on the perception
of systemic abuse by millionaires shielding wealth in mansions in
Florida, Texas, and a handful of other states with unlimited homestead
exemptions.231 This resulted in a perverse confluence of partisan
support for bankruptcy reform proposals.232 Conservatives

227

See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–57.
See infra notes 230-252 and accompanying text.
229
This Article takes no moral position. It should be noted, however, that
legislation designed to specifically solve the “millionaire mansion” problem could
very easily harm the middle class debtors exemption laws should protect. The goal
of the Code should be to incentivize productive activity, not to choose deserving
parties. As discussed in Part II(A) above, the equitable powers of the judiciary are
the proper forum for determining just desserts.
230
See infra notes 253-255 and accompanying text.
231
See Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1129–36.
232
See generally Jacoby, supra note 77.
228
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complained that the federal system and its deference to powerful state
exemption laws allowed profligate citizens to discharge debts without
the social stigma that had once accompanied bankruptcy.233 Liberals
declined to argue the point, and instead decried the unfairness of the
proposed bankruptcy reform that rendered bankruptcy filing more
difficult for all but the very wealthy.234 Thus, it seemed for a period of
nearly a decade that Congress was close to passing an omnibus
bankruptcy bill that would clamp down on state exemption power.235
There was a problem with the public outcry against the
“millionaire’s mansion” loophole: it lacked any basis in statistical
relevance.236 Multiple studies revealed no statistically significant
abuse of bankruptcy and exemption laws by any citizens, rich or
poor.237 In fact, data overwhelmingly showed that the vast majority of
233

See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey Jr., Creditors Lead Push to Curb Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at BU10 (“‘The only reasonable explanation [for the
increase in bankruptcy filings] is that the stigma of bankruptcy is all but dead....”’
(quoting Rep. George Gekas (R-Penn.)); Peter Pae & Stephanie Stoughton,
Personal Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record: Easy Credit Blamed, Congress May Act,
WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A1 (“[N]ow [bankruptcy is] no big deal. It's a way of
doing business. I can't completely explain why the stigma is gone, but it's gone.”
(quoting Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.)); Bloomberg News, Filings Worry
Greenspan, Times-Picayune, Mar. 20, 1997, at C6 (quoting Alan Greenspan as
saying that “personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their
sense of shame in filing for bankruptcy court protection”).
234
See Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1129–31; Susan Schmidt, Torricelli's Money
Push Also Raises Some Hackles: Business Fills Senate Democratic Coffers, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2000, at A1 (noting resentment of Democratic politicians).
235
See Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1098–1107 (describing legislative history).
236
See Scott Fay et al., The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 706, 714–16 (2002) (noting that a nationwide homestead exemption cap of
$100,000 would impact 0.004% of bankruptcy filings); Gen. Accounting Office,
Pub. No. GAO/GGD-99-118R, Bankruptcy Reform: Use of the Homestead
Exemption by Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors in the Northern District of Texas and
the Southern District of Florida in 1998, at 1–3 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99118r.pdf [Hereinafter GAO Study] (showing
that about 1% of bankruptcy filers in Texas and Florida carried over $100,000 in
homestead equity); Todd J. Zywicki, Why So Many Bankruptcies and What to Do
About It: An Economic Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy
Reform 102 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper Series
No. 03-46, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id =454121 (noting that “the
impact of the unlimited homestead exemption on bankruptcy filings is relatively
trivial” and that any changes in exemption policy would probably not impact filing
rates).
237
See sources cited, supra note 236.
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bankruptcy filings were by middle- and lower-class families unlikely
to own real estate free of significant mortgage obligations.238
Furthermore, statutory controls existed that prevented criminals and
tortfeasors from transferring assets to exempt status.239
The media manipulation that resulted in BAPCPA’s passage is
well documented.240 Interestingly, much of the lobbying push for the
bill carried an intense anti-intellectual tone, with numerous lobbyists
and journalists complaining about the “bankruptcy establishment.”241
This supposedly tight-knit group included creditors’ attorneys in
addition to debtors’ attorneys and scholars.242 This line of argument,
however, combined with media hype in the burgeoning 24-hour news
age, allowed lobbyists and journalists to ignore the facts and realities
of consumer bankruptcy.

238

See GAO Study, supra note 227, at 2 (showing median homestead
exemptions in Florida and Texas of under $10,000); Elizabeth Warren, The
Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1777, 1780–87 (describing results of demographic studies of bankruptcy
filers).
239
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2011) (excepting certain debts from discharge).
Section 523, which has remained consistent in substance since the 1898 act, excepts
from discharge any debts acquired as a result of fraud, crime, intentional torts, etc.
See Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13
Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 655, 663–67 (2005) (describing history of discharge and
exceptions).
240
See generally Jacoby, supra note 77 (describing the process by which
BAPCPA was negotiated by politicians and lobbyists via the news media).
241
See, e.g., BILL MCCOLLUM, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: A RETURN TO
RESPONSIBILITY, HILL (May 20, 1998) (describing a “campaign of false information
being disseminated by bankruptcy attorneys, bankruptcy ‘experts' and other people
maligning the legislation to further their agendas,” but finding that “after subjecting
the multitude of half-truths and false statements disseminated by the critics...to the
light of day, they just don't stand up”); Tom Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in
Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Provision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2001, at A28 [hereinafter
Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform] (“The bankruptcy
establishment likes the system the way they have been running it.”) (quoting an
industry analyst); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge,
Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at A1
[hereinafter Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge] (stating that the bankruptcy
establishment simply prefers the status quo); see also Jacoby, supra note 77, at 1092
(describing the phenomenon).
242
See sources cited, supra note 241.
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Little has changed. Because of either poor drafting, lack of
will, or creative judicial interpretation,243 BAPCPA arguably failed to
limit homestead exemptions and prevent abuse by millionaires.244
Arguments for exemption uniformity on these same grounds continue
to be offered.245 Indeed, the “bankruptcy establishment” seems to
have retreated somewhat after BAPCPA, in part as bankruptcy took a
backseat to other social insurance programs after the financial crisis,
and in part due to fatalism over their rejection by political
authorities.246
BAPCPA may have decreased the utilization of unlimited
homestead exemptions to some extent.247 The law’s biggest impact
was the installation of a “means test,” by which wealthy debtors are
shunted into Chapter 13 to attempt to pay off debts under a long-term
plan, potentially followed by discharge.248 The combination of the
means test with the new Code provisions limiting debtor movement,
malfeasance, and pre-bankruptcy planning effectively impede rich,
243

See, e.g., supra note 148 (describing judicial resolution of controversy over
when a debtor is deemed to have acquired an interest in the homestead for purpose
of revised § 522).
244
See Elijah M. Alper, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: How Bapcpa May
Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1942–43 (2007);
Leigh J. Francis, Calling All Debtors, Want to Defraud Your Creditors? Here Is
How: The Tenancy by the Entirety Loophole and the Nullification of Section
522(O), (P), and (Q) of the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 1, 51–52 (2010).
245
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (listing post-BAPCPA pro-reform
publications).
246
See Stephen J. Lubben, Do Empirical Bankruptcy Studies Matter?, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 715, 715–16 (“it is too easy to dismiss a study that conflicts
with one's policy preferences by pointing to some other factor or interpretation that
might explain the results. More research is called for, while policy proceeds
irrespective of evidence”).
247
See Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An
Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended
Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 204–05 (2007) (finding with
empirical evidence that BAPCPA “forced higher-wealth individuals, who also have
more debt, into plans in which they must repay a portion of their debts”); cf. Robert
M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 386 (“[t]he higher debt-to-income ratios among
the families that filed bankruptcy in 2007 suggest that Americans are struggling
harder than ever before they collapse into bankruptcy”).
248
See Lawless, supra note 247, at 385–86 (explaining that focus on the means
test fails to account for types of debt and debt-to-income ratios).
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morally blameworthy debtors from moving to Florida to shelter
money from victims.249 Of course, shelters exist for some wealthy
debtors already living in high-exemption states.250
Similarly, individuals remain free to move to high-limit
exemption states and simply not file for bankruptcy, daring their
creditors to sue in state court to avoid transactions or bypass
exemptions.251 However, it bears repeating that this “loophole” has no
statistical relevance. The vast majority of the millions of Americans
who file for bankruptcy each year have little to no homestead equity
to exempt.252
In fact, the most important exemption-related issue for most
Americans was rarely mentioned during the years of BAPCPA hype:
the consumer loan interest rate tradeoff.253 As previously noted, all
citizens of high-limit exemption states tend to pay higher interest rates
as a result of those laws and the attendant greater default risk borne by
lenders.254 Poor citizens bear the brunt of the rate increase for two
reasons: first, poor citizens rely most on consumer lending, and
second, poor citizens are less likely to own their homes and thus less
likely to benefit from the exemptions.255 While bankruptcy has always
protected the middle and upper classes more than the poor, the Code’s
purpose is not understood to encompass an actual wealth transfer from
the poor to the rich. Yet, inside or outside bankruptcy, high homestead
exemption laws may comprise such a transfer.
It is worth noting that draconian federal exemption controls
could have the simple effect of discouraging bankruptcy filings as
debtors struggle to keep their assets as long as possible. But such an
outcome, rather than preventing bankruptcy abuse, might simply
249

See Moringiello, supra note 226, at 638 (explaining that BAPCPA “may
result in fewer bankruptcy filings by those few very high asset, high debt individuals
who can afford to move to another state to escape their creditors”).
250
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (listing no restrictions for debtors that already maintain
a homestead in the filing state). But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (restricting discharge
on basis of debtor malfeasance).
251
See Moringiello, supra note 226, at 638–39; cf. Havoco of Am. v. Hill, 790
So.2d 1018, 1030 (Fla. 2001) (noting that “a homestead acquired by a debtor with
the specific intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not excepted” from statelaw exemption).
252
See supra notes 236-239 and accompanying text.
253
See Posner, supra note 142.
254
See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
255
See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
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encourage debtors to rely more heavily on non-bankruptcy exercise of
state exemption laws.256 In state courts, creditors could access more
assets, but with the significant loss of bankruptcy’s predictability and
preference for equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.
Meanwhile, excessive litigation would drain available assets into the
coffers of attorneys. In other words, overly harsh federal exemptions
could raise creditor litigation costs and decrease debtor payout. State
exemption laws applicable in bankruptcy therefore represent another
state policy balance meant to encourage filings to the extent beneficial
to all parties within each state’s economy.
IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR NON-UNIFORMITY

Lawmakers could resolve concerns about the fairness and
advisability of the bankruptcy system as described in Part III in the
short term. Section A of this Part proposes methods for bankruptcy
courts to achieve optimal results using existing statutory powers.257
Section B discusses the steps state legislatures can take to ensure that
their laws maximize the welfare of both debtors and creditors.258
A. Courts Can and Do Use Code Provisions to Ensure Equitable
Results Consistent With the Goals of the Bankruptcy Regime
Bankruptcy courts occupy a unique realm in American law.
Situated as a unit within the courts of each federal district, bankruptcy
courts nevertheless derive authority from Congress under the first
article of the U.S. Constitution.259 Their jurisdiction and practices are
more severely limited by legislation than the district and appellate
courts.260 They are considered separate from the district courts
empowered under the Constitution’s third article.261 Regardless, they

256

See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. X, §4(a)(2) (exempting debtor property without
regard to bankruptcy status); cf. Havoco, 790 So.2d at 1030 (allowing homestead
exemption without regard for debtor’s good faith).
257
See infra notes 259-272 and accompanying text.
258
See infra notes 273-280 and accompanying text.
259
28 U.S.C. §§ 151–59 (2011) (organizing and documenting authority of
bankruptcy courts); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting Article I authority of bankruptcy courts).
260
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334.
261
See id. at § 151.
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consider the case law of the Article III courts—the Supreme Court, as
well as the Circuit appellate courts and to a lesser extent Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels (BAPs) and federal district courts—as precedents to
bind their decision-making.262
In addition to the bankruptcy courts’ place in the crossroads of
the internal federal government structure, they stand in a peculiar
intersection of state and federal law.263 In its essence, bankruptcy law
is property law, a fundamental domain of the states. Very few issues
may be contested or adjudicated in bankruptcy courts without
knowledge of the property rights of the parties under state law.264 And
yet, once property rights are determined, the actions of the courts and
the parties may be determined under federal law.
The multiple conflicting elements inherent to the existence of
bankruptcy courts manifest themselves prominently in the issue of
exemptions. As previously discussed, exemptions are beasts of state
law, often backed by centuries of legislative precedent. Modern
bankruptcy law is much younger, and only relatively recently has it
attempted to enforce its own comprehensive system to shield
significant debtor assets from attachment by creditors.265
Perhaps most troubling for the courts is the fact that the
precedential sources on the exemption issue derive from a complex
262

Like all federal courts, bankruptcy courts follow the doctrine of stare decisis
in respecting the decisions of “superior” courts. The value of precedent to and
among the bankruptcy courts is a matter of heated debate, and was especially so
when BAPs were introduced in the 1990s. See generally Daniel J. Bussel, Power,
Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1063 (1994) (arguing that an “appropriate and sensible distribution of law-making
power given the institutional framework” requires adherence to BAP precedent);
Christopher F. Carlton, Greasing the Squeaky Wheels of Justice: Designing the
Bankruptcy Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 37 (1999)
(arguing for greater precedential value for bankruptcy courts); David A. Levin,
Precedent and the Assertion of Bankruptcy Court Autonomy: Efficient or Arrogant?,
12 BANKR. DEV. J. 185 (1995) (arguing that development of bankruptcy law
requires adherence to BAP precedent).
263
See supra notes 22-157 and accompanying text (describing concurrent
development of state and federal laws relating to bankruptcy).
264
See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the prevalence of
state law claims among the millions of bankruptcy filings each year).
265
Compare Tabb, supra note 108, at 7–8 (describing origins of bankruptcy law
in 16th century British statutes that treated insolvent citizens as criminals), with
supra notes 140-150 (describing the recent efforts of Congress to harmonize state
and federal laws).
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mix of state, federal, legislative, and common law sources. For
instance, nearly every federal circuit court has noted that each state’s
exemption laws should be construed “liberally in favor of the
debtor.”266 In interpreting state law, however, bankruptcy courts must
sometimes note that as a pure matter of state law, some exemptions
have traditionally been interpreted via strict adherence to the letter of
state legislation.267 How can courts comply with a duty to “liberally”
interpret a law apparently meant to be interpreted as literally and
narrowly as possible?
The answer is that the federal courts must, and do,
acknowledge the overwhelmingly federal nature of the bankruptcy
system in the modern period. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
noted, the debtor’s “fresh start” is the fundamental goal of consumer
bankruptcy.268 Of course, a general goal should not necessarily trump
a specific statute.269 But there are cases in which the state legislation
unequivocally and unfairly impedes the debtor’s fresh start—for
instance, a tortfeasor or random accident destroys the debtor’s
homestead and the debtor receives recompense in the form of a
previously non-exempt asset.270 In such cases, it is necessary and
appropriate for the bankruptcy courts to expand state law to carry out
the provisions and intent of the Code.271
In many cases, however, the fact-specific fairness of the
parties’ plight will not be so obvious and will implicate delicate
matters of state and federal policy. For instance, the states’ decision
not to include mobile homes within homestead exemption laws is,
hopefully, a deliberate choice to value private land ownership and
development over renting.272 Some states may prefer the former to
266

See, e.g., In re Caron, 82 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1996); KLC, Inc. v. Trayner,
426 F.3d 172, 176 (2nd Cir. 2005); In re Barker, 768 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1985).
267
See, e.g., Plant, 300 B.R. at 24 (citing Hoffpauir, 125 B.R. at 271–74);
Kelly, 334 B.R. at 775.
268
See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
269
See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522 (1996) (“specific enactments
trump general ones in carefully constructed statutes”); compare 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)
(requiring deference to states that have opted out of federal exemption laws), with
id. § 105(a) (granting expansive power to effectuate “any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”).
270
See supra notes 166-176 and accompanying text.
271
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
272
It could also be legislative inertia, malfeasance, or poor incentivization. See
Posner, supra note 142, at 94–108; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
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encourage land cultivation and home construction. Others may view
increased protection of mobile homeowners as a necessary adaptation
to economic realities. Furthermore, the value limits on homestead
exemptions and particular exceptions within state laws tend to be
idiosyncratic for specific reasons: acknowledging the economic
realities of each state and the need to protect some particularly
vulnerable citizens.
Although the bankruptcy courts should interpret homestead
laws “liberally in favor of the debtor,” a general judicial expansion of
federal power over state exemptions would be unnecessary. It would
be unwise, unfounded, and an explicit imposition on the longstanding
rights of states in an area where the federal government has already
taken effective control. Judges already act in the interest of federal
policy, rendering bankruptcy “uniform” to the extent that federal
policy demands in the area of exemptions.
B. Exemptions Are the Proper Domain of the States
Bankruptcy non-uniformity in the area of exemptions is a
proper result of the federalist system. Although some scholars have
argued that state exemption laws are out of date, few have sought to
place them within the context of the traditional role of state
legislation. As Justice Louis Brandeis noted, states at their best are
“laboratories of democracy,” in which policies may be tested at the
local level before gaining more widespread adoption.273 State
legislative authority has two particular benefits worth mentioning
here: first, it allows states to pursue policy goals specific to their
geographic and economic realities; and second, it provides instruction
to other states and the federal government on the effectiveness of
various policies and methods.274

Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594
(1980) (arguing that risk-averse nature of politicians impedes innovation at state
level).
273
New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also U.S. Const. amd. 10 (reserving powers to the states). But see
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 271, at 594 (arguing that risk-averse nature of
politicians impedes innovation at state level).
274
See, e.g., Allen Wilson, Note and Comment, More than Just a Boon to
Wealthy Debtors: How Texas Homestead Law Helped Insulate Texas from the
Foreclosure Typhoon, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 999 (2012) (arguing that Texas
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Scholars may have a point, however, in that some state laws
are out of date or poorly drafted.275 As a result, bankruptcy judges are
placed in the difficult position of having to disregard state laws where
federal policy so requires.276 Furthermore, evidence is scant to show
that state exemptions actually achieve legislative aims to encourage
economic risk-taking and manage consumer credit markets.277
Unfortunately, it is difficult to engage in any serious
legislative conversation about bankruptcy because of the tendency of
lobbyists and the news media to purposefully ignore economically
meaningful data.278 While it is fairly common and simple to engage in
discussion of how bankruptcy law incentivizes behavior once a debtor
is effectively insolvent and thus contemplating filing, it is more
difficult for legislators to understand and discuss without judgment
the fact that individual debtors engage in routine activities in the
knowledge that failure is possible.279 Doing so, however, forces
recognition that consumers figure bankruptcy laws and related state
law into their contemplation of the expected value of risk-taking.
To truly understand state exemption laws and their role in the
federal system, states should undertake to isolate the effect of the laws
to the greatest extent possible and study their effects. Such studies
should thus compare different state policies, accounting for particular
exceptions and varieties of implementation. Furthermore, the studies
should control for the cost of living in each state, consumer lending
exemption law shielded the state from the effects of the 2008–09 financial crisis on
homeowners); see also Posner, supra note 142, at 94–108 (describing the pre-1978
policy debate over exemptions and the political factors influencing the resulting
legislation). Posner states that the best argument for federal control is one of
“spillovers,” i.e. externality problems that could cause states to compete with each
other in a “race to the bottom.” Id. at 97–98. With some explanation, Posner
dismisses the spillover debate and states that “[t]he normative case for federal
control of exemption policy, however, was weak.” Id. at 97–100. Thus these pre1978 arguments have not been included in this Article, which is intended to address
arguments raised roughly since 1997, in the ongoing debate over what became
BAPCPA. Likewise, this Article focuses more on policy effectiveness than political
economy, though Posner’s Article is fascinating reading for those interested in how
the sausage is made.
275
See supra note 12, at 162–191 and accompanying text.
276
See supra notes 259-272 and accompanying text.
277
See Hynes, supra note 143, at 517; Posner, supra note 142, at 94–108.
278
See generally Jacoby, supra note 77 (describing process by which
bankruptcy reform was negotiated through news media).
279
See id.
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costs, as well as distinctions involving geography and development
density.280 Only by knowing exactly how their laws affect the
behavior of debtors (and thus creditors as well) will state politicians
be able to have an intelligent discussion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The history of exemptions shows good reason for the federal
Code’s allowance of variation between states. Debtors need to be able
to move between states to engage in socially and economically
beneficial activities. States need to be able to enact policy agendas
based on ever-changing, location- and culture-specific factors.
There are two specific reasons why the Code’s deference to
state exemptions serves all interests. First, the current regime properly
allows states to experiment with new law and policy in pursuit of
localized policy goals. Second, the regime allows judges to navigate
federal and state laws, applying them as faithfully as possible while
serving the central bankruptcy policies of the debtor’s fresh start and
equal treatment of similarly situated creditors. Thus, the Code
encourages debtors to enter the federal bankruptcy system and earn a
fresh start with state-protected assets, while also providing creditors
with the equal treatment state law cannot provide.
Legislators and scholars should be wary of arguments for
uniformity in consumer bankruptcy. Recent history shows that
moralistic and constitutional concerns serve as a mere façade for the
greed of unsecured creditors. Excessive federal controls discourage
bankruptcy filings without diminishing the ability of wealthy
criminals and tortfeasors to abuse state-law protections. Exemption
policy discussions should instead favor a state-level, data-driven
approach to examine how laws actually impact debtor behavior and
further policy goals.

280

Some states already do this by limiting exemptions with respect to size. But
a hard-line size limit (e.g., Florida’s 160 unincorporated acres vs. 1 incorporated)
may be inadequate given the wide range in land value from downtowns to suburbs
to open farmland.

